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The United States Suprme Courth understandmg ofpolice practces plays a simficant
role in the development of the constitutional rules that regulate officer conduct. As it
approaches the questions of whether to engage in constitutional regulation and what form of
regulation to adopt; the Court discusses the environment in which officeis act describes specific
police practices, and explains what motivates officers. Yet the majority of the Court factual
assertions are made entirely without support or citation, rsing concerns about whether the
Court is acting based on a complete and accurate perweption. When it comes to polichig facts,
the Court too often gets it wrong.
This Article explors the influence that the Courth conception of polichig has on the
creation and modification of constitutional nons. It demonstrates that misundestandigs
about law enforementhave led to constitutional rules that fail to ahgn with the world that they
were designed to rgulate. Confusion about the facts upon which a rule is built creates a gap
between the conceptual justifcation of the rule and its practical consequences, between the
effect that the rule was intended to have and the effect it actualy ha. Thus, misalignment
results in the under- or overrgdation of officer behavior an4 corespondngly the under- and
overprotection ofliberty and pivacy inteests. This observation offers one explanation for why
the Courts constitutional pronouncements often fal to have the anticipated result Having
identified the effects that follow frm basing a rule on a faulty factual prmise, I explore ways to
narrow the gap. When constitutional rules are predicated on emprical information, a mor
accurate understanding ofpolice pactices will better align those rules with reality leading to
both more prcise constitutional rule making and mom efficacious liberty protections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional rules that regulate policing firmly reject
guesswork as a justification for official action. The constitutional
protections afforded to individual liberty and privacy interests cannot
be satisfied by "mere hunches,"' subjective beliefs,' and speculation.!
Instead, intrusions are permissible only when they are based on
objectively reasonable conclusions drawn from specific and articulable
facts.!
When it comes to developing the factual basis for the
constitutional rules that regulate the police, however, the Court is less
1. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,274 (2002).
2. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
3. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) ("[P]robable cause ... turn[s] on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.").
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that an officer's "inarticulate
hunches" will not support an investigative detention); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175 (1949) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)) (holding that suspicion,
without more, does not justify an arrest).
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demanding. In Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment cases, it is
common for the Cour to make an assertion about some broadly
applicable aspect of policing-the environment in which officers
operate, police practices, or what motivates officers, for example-and
to rely on that assertion as it develops or justifies the scope and
contours of constitutional law.' Yet the Court only rarely provides
external support or citation for its assertions. This practice raises a
series of serious questions. What does the Court say about the police
and why? If a constitutional doctrine is built on a factual foundation
that is incomplete or inaccurate, how does that affect the rule? What
could the Court do to improve its fact-finding processes to reduce the
possibility of factual misunderstandings? This Article begins to
answer these questions, which are both important in their own right
and a critical part of the broader conversation about how to regulate the
police.
The facts that the Court relies on in any given case fall into one of
two categories. "Adjudicative facts" are case-specific details: the who,
what, when, where, why, and how of a particular suit. In Terry v Ohio,
for example, the Court's recitation of adjudicative facts included a
description of how Officer McFadden approached men he suspected of
"casing' a jewelry store, frisked them, and recovered two firearms.'
This Article is focused on the second category: "legislative facts." In
contrast to case-specific adjudicative facts, legislative facts are
"generalized facts about the world" that "transcend" the case at bar.'
For example, the Terry Court's assertion that "American criminals have
a long tradition of armed violence" against police officers is a
statement of legislative fact.' Terry is hardly unusual; many cases
include both adjudicative and legislative facts.'" Florida v Jardines
provides a convenient illustration; in that case, the Court used both
5. I acknowledge that speaking of "the Court" as a singular entity is something of a
fiction. SeeAdrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They Not an It Interpretive Theory and the
Fallacy ofDivision, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005). Nevertheless, the practice of
making broad factual suppositions is so common among the Justices that despite the inherent
inexactitude, speaking of "the Court" seems accurate in this context.
6. Cf Brenda C. See, Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-
Making Process, 40 GoNz. L. REv. 157, 191 (2004/05) (distinguishing between the Court's
rule-creation function and its dispute-resolution capacity).
7. 392 U.S. at 5-7.
8. Allison Orr Larsen, Confronthig Supreme Court Fact Findmg, 98 VA. L. REv.
1255, 1255-57 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. 392 U.S. at 23.
10. The Federal Rules of Evidence have taken a permissive approach to legislative
facts, exempting them from the restrictions on judicial notice. FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory
committee's note (1972 Proposed Rules).
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adjudicative facts, describing how a police canine was walked up to the
front door of a suspected drug house," and legislative facts, stating that
"a visitor knocking on the door is routine." 2 The Federal Rules of
Evidence have taken a permissive view of legislative facts, exempting
them from the restrictions on judicial notice."
Police-related legislative facts find their way into judicial
opinions as generalizations about the environment in which police
services typically are delivered, statements about common police
practices, and assertions about what motivates individual police
officers. The Court's use of legislative facts about policing has gone
largely unnoticed by commentators. There has been no shortage of
criticism about resulting doctrines, of course. For more than forty
years, academics have turned their attention to the "deeply
impoverished""4 "mess"" of "embarrass[ing]"" rules that govern law
enforcement behavior." With remarkably few exceptions, scholars set
about chopping a path through the tangled skein by proposing new
constitutional rules or modifications to the way that the courts apply
existing standards," by identifying a thematic structure or background
theory for constitutional decision making,2" or by offering suggestions
about how to improve compliance with constitutional norms.2 The
11. 133 S. Ct. 1409,1413 (2013).
12. Id at 1416.
13. FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee's note (1972 Proposed Rules).
14. Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1119,
1119 (2008) (discussing the Fourth Amendment rules governing police uses of force).
15. Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The
Limits ofLawyenag, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973) (discussing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
generally).
16. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757,
757 (1994) (criticizing how complicated Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has become and
arguing for a pure reasonableness analysis).
17. The criticisms appear to be vocalized most often in the Fourth Amendment
context. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]his
Court's decisions in the realm of search and seizure are hardly notable for their
predictability."); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment 58 MINN.
L. REv. 349, 349 (1974) ("For clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not
the Supreme Court's most successfid product.").
18. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
'riincipled Basis" Rather than an "Empircal Proposition'?, 16 CREIGTION L. REv. 565
(1983).
19. See, eg., Harmon, supa note 14 (advocating that courts change the way they
approach determining whether an officer's use of force was constitutionally reasonable).
20. See, eg., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustwment Theory of the Fourth
Amendmn4 125 HARv. L. REv. 476 (2011).
21. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Whatk Wrong with Qualified Immunity? 62 FLA.
L. REv. 851 (2010).
[Vol. 88:847850
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body of scholarship dedicated to identifying how constitutional norms
influence or should influence police behavior is vast indeed, but it is
incomplete. In our localist legal tradition, the Court is the sole
centralized regulator of police conduct; before we can engage with the
normative aspects of police regulation, we must better understand how
the Court views police and the role that those views play in its
regulatory decisions. If it is true that "[t]he Court's conclusions about
how the world operates ... shape the contours of its constitutional
[rule making],"22 it is a mistake to focus on the contours to the
exclusion of the Court's conclusions about the world.
When the Court engages in its "law declaration" function-
creating, modifying, or striking down a legal rule2 3-it does so based
on its understanding of how events play out in the world, how things
actually happen. The Court's perceptions can be-and often are-
incomplete or inaccurate. In the context of policing facts, the risk of
inaccuracy is particularly cogent. Liberty stands at the core of Western
conceptions of government and is directly implicated by the limits we
place on the government's authority to police the citizenry. Those
limits are demarcated largely through the rules of criminal procedure,
and liberty values are threatened when those rules fail to align with the
way that government authority is actually exercised. Those rules are
more likely to suffer from misalignment when they are built on a shaky
factual predicate. Thus, even if one were to take a permissive view of
the Court's use of legislative facts generally, the privileged position that
liberty has in our social and legal tradition makes the Court's casual
approach to policing facts deeply troubling. The Court's use of
legislative facts about police deserves more scrutiny than it has yet
received.
This Article provides such scrutiny in three parts. Part II
describes the Court's practice of referring to and relying on
information about the policing environment, law enforcement
practices, officer motivations, and the anticipated reaction of officers
to judicial decisions as a predicate for the development of the
constitutional rules that regulate police.
22. Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The
Unreaity Obscuiy and Incivihty of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter
Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv 507,510 (2001).
23. Under the now familiar taxonomy of "basic adjudicatory models," the Court
engages in "law declaration" when it "say[s] what the law is." In contrast, the Court engages
in "dispute resolution" when it resolves a dispute between the parties to a case. Henry Paul
Monaghan, Essay, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112
COLUM. L. REv. 665, 668 (2012).
2014] 851
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Part El identifies the problems that can arise when the Court
bases the justification for a constitutional norm on an inaccurate
factual predicate. Unlike the proverbial house built on sand, a
constitutional decision that rests on an unsound factual foundation will
not necessarily collapse. Instead, it will result in a rule that is
misaligned with the world that it is intended to regulate. When rules
do collapse, it is often because experience has proven that a rule once
thought appropriate, then considered ill-fitting, has become simply
unworkable. Using examples from three important criminal law
doctrines-uses of force, consent searches, and the exclusionary
rule-I demonstrate the potential for misunderstandings about
legislative facts that result in ill-fitting rules.
With regard to uses of force, the Court believes that officers use
violence in an environment that demands "split-second judgments,"
justifying significant deference to an officer's decision of whether to
use force and what force to use. However, only a very small
percentage of use-of-force incidents resemble the Court's intuitions,
suggesting that the standard used to review police violence may not
often fit the circumstances of the incident itself.
In the context of consent searches, the Court has held that
officers need not inform individuals of the right to refuse consent,
stating that such a requirement would be "thoroughly impractical." A
close review of the circumstances that typically precede a request for
consent, though, suggests that it may not be as impractical as the Court
believes; indeed, several states and police agencies require officers to
issue just such a warning.
The modem exclusionary rule is predicated solely on the Court's
belief that the suppression of evidence, and the corresponding
reduction in the possibility of conviction, can meaningfully deter
officer malfeasance. But there are no formal mechanisms that would
encourage officers to reevaluate the quality of their arrests based on
the conviction results, and informal pressures actively discourage
officer interest, leading officers to pay less attention to convictions
than the Court assumes.
In Part IV, I suggest ways to narrow the knowledge gap and
improve the alignment between what the Court expects a rule to do
and what it actually does. Fundamentally, the development of
constitutional rules predicated on a more accurate understanding of
police practices will better align those rules with the practices and
incentives of the officers that they are intended to regulate, leading to
both more precise and efficacious constitutional rule making.
852 [Vol. 88:847
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II. POLICE-RELATED LEGISLATIVE FACTS
In this Part, I describe the Supreme Court's practice of referring
to and relying on information about policing as a predicate or
justification for the development of the constitutional rules that
regulate police. We live in an increasingly empirically driven society.
Marketing companies rely on consumer analytics to maximize the
efficiency of their advertising across broad segments of the
population,24 and retailers track personal shopping behavior to develop
a sophisticated understanding of individual consumers.25 Individual
consumers now make personal decisions based on information that did
not exist in easily accessible forms a decade ago: a significant
majority of people-now over 800/-rely heavily on consumer
reviews when making purchasing decisions." Hollywood scriptwriters
can use statistics to evaluate their ideas in light of prior films, both
successful and unsuccessful." Even lawyers have gotten in on the
game, using data-driven analytics to set their fees, predict case results,
and hire new employees.28 The political world has followed suit;
President Obama's reelection campaign relied on social science
research and behavioral economics to boost his image, deal with
negative information, and promote voter turnout.29 Nor is the public
sector lagging behind; police agencies have used statistics to develop
targeted enforcement priorities since the development of CompStat in
the mid-1990s."
24. Christine Moorman, Spending on MarketingAnalytics, CMO SuRvEY (Mar. 28,
2012), http://www.cmosurvey.org/blog/spending-on-marketing-analytics/.
25. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=1&
r-3&hp& (discussing Target's ability to identify when a woman is pregnant based on changes
in her shopping patterns).
26. Helen Leggatt, hat Reaction Do Consumers Have to Negative Reviews?,
BizREPORT (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.bizreport.com/2009/02/what-reaction-do-consumers
have_tonegativereviews.html.
27. Brooks Barnes, SolvIng Equation of a Hit Fim Scnpt, with Data, N.Y. TIMES
(May 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/business/media/solving-equation-of-a-
hit-film-script-with-data.html?.
28. Joe Dysart, The Dawn ofBIGDATA, 99 A.B.A. J. 42,43-45 (2013).
29. Benedict Carey, Academic 'Dream Tem' Helped Obama k Effor4 N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/health/dream-team-of-behavioral-
scientists-advised-obama-campaign.html?pagewanted=all.
30. CompStat is a management philosophy that focused on increasing the authority
of middle managers and has led to the widespread use of computer analysis of geographical
crime information to identify repeat problems and develop "[h]ighly focused enforcement
activities." VINCENT E. HENRY, THE COMPSTAT PARADIGM: MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
IN POLICING, BUSINESS AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 25-27 (2003).
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Considered in this context, it is no surprise that, now more than
ever, litigants and courts rely on empirical information to support
arguments and justify opinions." The Supreme Court's practice of
using legislative facts about law enforcement fits neatly into this
background picture of having and using more information. The way
that the Court presents and uses police-related legislative facts is
hardly standardized, of course. In its opinions, for example, the Court
depicts the environment in which police services are delivered,
provides details about police practices, describes the factors that
motivate law enforcement officers, and predicts how rules will affect
police and civilians alike. The Court's factual suppositions range from
the painstakingly precise32 to the hopelessly vague," from the
unassailable34 to the highly suspect," and from the value-neutral" to the
value-laden." Police-related legislative facts include backward-
looking historical analysis of police practices," forward-looking
predictions about how a particular rule will change police behavior,"
and contemporary observations about the abilities40 and motivations4'
of law enforcement officers.
The focus of this Article is less about the types of facts that the
Court uses than it is about how the Court develops and presents those
facts. The relevant distinction for current purposes, then, is the use of
external support for a given legislative fact. In this regard, the Court's
31. Tracey L. Meares, Three Objectons to the Use of Empincism in Crminal Law
andProcedure-And ThreeAnswers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv 851, 853-54.
32. In Tennessee v Gamer, the Court stated that 86.8% of departmental and
municipal policies expressly prohibit the use of deadly force against nondangerous felons.
471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985).
33. The Court has, for example, described policing as "dangerous." Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 n.10 (1996) ("Police officers engaged in the dangerous and difficult
tasks associated with protecting the safety of our communities not only confront the risk of
physical harm but also face stressful circumstances that may give rise to anxiety, depression,
fear, or anger."); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 n.3 (1977) (per curiam) ("We
recognize that the life of a police officer is a dangerous one.").
34. Consider the uncontroversial statement that "most law enforcement officers are
armed." United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205 (2002).
35. See discussion mfra Part II.B.
36. Descriptions of historical police practices, for example.
37. For example, factual assertions about the authority that police need to have to
fulfill the role that society expects.
38. See, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,445-55 (1966).
39. See, eg., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (declining to require
a warrant in certain circumstances because such a requirement would "hamper effective law
enforcement").
40. See, e.g., Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 991 (2012) (suggesting that police are
aware of "many circumstances in which lawful conduct may portend imminent violence").
41. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009).
854 [Vol. 88:847
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practice is sporadic at best. In the following sections, I provide
illustrative examples of the Court's statements about police, grouping
together various types of assertions under the admittedly generic term
"fact." In the first section, I describe occasions on which the Court has
bolstered its factual assertions with an explicit citation. In the second,
I turn to the Court's unsupported suppositions.
A. Supported Statements
In two seminal cases, the Court relied extensively on a range of
sources to develop a sense of what police do and how they do it. In
Manda v ArLona, the Supreme Court instituted the now familiar
warnings only after first engaging in an extensive analysis of police
interrogation procedures.4 2 It first set the stage by discussing historical
and contemporary interrogation practices, including the use of the
"third degree" and psychological ploys such as isolation, confronta-
tion, and deception. To prove its point, the Court relied on no less than
six police training manuals; three texts about policing; eight academic
articles; three news articles; reports by the Wickersham Commission,
the Commission on Civil Rights, and the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU); fifteen prior Supreme Court cases; two additional
federal cases; and five state cases.43  Once it concluded that
interrogation practices create an inherently coercive atmosphere, the
Court crafted a solution-the Miranda warnings-by drawing
inspiration from the interrogation practices used by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) as well as the laws governing police
interrogations in England, Scotland, India, and Ceylon (now known as
Sri Lanka)." And less than a decade ago, the Court again referred to
police manuals, training resources, and a number of reported cases as
proof that officers were commonly either dancing around Manda's
warning requirement or ignoring it entirely.45
The second landmark case demonstrating the Court's extensive
use of hard facts is Tennessee v Garner, in which the Court rejected
the common law rule that authorized the use of force, including deadly
force, to stop all fleeing felons.46 The Court concluded that officers
simply did not need that authority, relying for support on "the policies
42. 384 U.S. at 445-55, 483-89.
43. Id at 445-56.
44. Id. at 483-89.
45. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609-11 & nn.2-3 (2004).
46. 471 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1985).
20 14] 8 55
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adopted by the police departments themselves."17 The Court explicitly
discussed the policies of the FBI and the New York City Police
Department (NYPD), which "forb[ade] the use of firearms except
when necessary to prevent death or grievous bodily harm."" It also
referred to the written policies of forty-four police departments that
had enacted similar prohibitions. The Court cited the results of
research by the Boston Police Department Planning and Research
Division, which reported that a "majority" of police departments in
large cities had adopted restrictive deadly-force policies that cut back
on the common law "fleeing felon" rule. Going beyond individual
agencies, the Court looked to a report by a trade organization, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, which stated that 86.8%
of "departmental and municipal policies" expressly prohibited the use
of deadly force against nondangerous felons.49 Finally, the Court
referred to the accreditation criteria of the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies and to an amicus brief
filed by the Police Foundation, which identified a restrictive deadly-
force policy as an industry best practice."o
Mimnda and Gamer stand out as perhaps the strongest examples
of the Court's use of citations and support for its factual assertions.
They are not entirely unique, though. In other cases, the Court has
explicitly identified a source of information for its conclusions. In
Anzona v Gant for example, the Court relied on "[t]he experience of
... 28 years" when it rejected the idea that the passenger compartment
of a vehicle is typically accessible to recent vehicle occupants who
have been arrested." As proof of that experience, the Court cited a
concurrence in a prior case-which, in turn, cited seven circuit court
cases 5 2-and quoted a search-and-seizure treatise for the proposition
that "it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable to fully
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id
49. Id. at 18-19. Here, as in other areas, the Court seems to base constitutional
doctrine on what a majority of relevant industry players actually do in practice. For more on
the widespread use of "evolving standards," which is often thought of as limited to Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, see Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexcepdonahsmn of "Evolving
Standads, " 57 UCLA L. REv. 365 (2009).
50. Garner, 471 U.S. at 18-19.
51. 556 U.S. 332, 350-51 (2009) (calling the prior generalization "unfounded" and
"faulty").
52. Id. at 341-42.
856 [Vol. 88: 847
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effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee's
vehicle remains.""
As Gant suggests, prior cases serve as a common source of
information about police. When the Court stated that even individuals
lying naked in bed may have ready access to a weapon and thus could
present a danger to officers serving a search warrant at a residence, it
cited three circuit court cases and two state cases.54 And when it noted
that, for officers trying to contact an individual at a residence, "[a]
forceful knock [by officers] may be necessary to alert the occupants
that someone is at the door," the Court cited a single case in which a
showering occupant did not hear officers' knocks."
On occasion, the Court explicitly relies on the lack of empirical
support to make its point. In Gamer, for example, the Court noted that
there was no "available evidence" to support the contention that "the
meaningful threat of deadly force ... discourage[ed] escape
attempts"" or reduced crime." And when it held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited officers from engaging in "discretionary spot
checks"-stopping vehicles at random and without suspicion to check
the operator's license and the vehicle's registration in an effort to
promote roadway safety-it did so in part because the government had
introduced no empirical data suggesting that the "contribution to
highway safety" would be more than "marginal at best.""
B. Unsupported Suppositions
Through Mhnd4 Gamer, and other cases, the Court
demonstrated its facility to use a range of sources as support for its
factual assertions about policing. As this section exhibits, however, its
more common practice is to make a statement without citation or
support. My intent in this section is to draw attention to the sheer
breadth of the suppositions that the Court has referred to or relied upon
without regard to the lack of support. That is not to say that the Court
is invariably wrong when it lacks support; clearly, that is not the case.
Instead, my point is that despite the significant role that police-related
legislative facts play across a broad doctrinal spectrum, it remains true
53. Id. at 343 n.4 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.1(c), at 525
(4th ed. 2004)).
54. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (per curian).
55. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (2011) (citing United States v. Banks,
540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003)).
56. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10 (1985).
57. Id. at 19.
58. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979).
2014] 857
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that "most constitutional fact-finding depend[s] on the [Court's] best
guess about the matter.""
As the Court sees it, law enforcement is a dangerous business.
Not only does the general environment present threats to both physical
safety and mental well-being,' but specific actions have been
identified as particularly risky, including traffic stops," approaching
stopped vehicles,' investigative detentions," and making unannounced
entries into homes." Given this background understanding, it is not
surprising that "most law enforcement officers are armed" and that
this "fact [is] well known to the public."' Circumstances require
officers to act quickly and with limited information in a variety of
situations: deciding to arrest," detain," or search" someone; writing
out affidavits in support of a warrant application;6 approaching a
residence;" executing a search warrant;' conducting a protective
59. David L. Faigman, 'Normative Constitutional Fact-Fndmig" Exploing the
Empical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 545 (1991);
see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administradve Lawmakng: A
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Cour4 71 MINN. L. REv. 1, 15 (1986) ("When the
Court lacks the needed information, it usually makes guesses.").
60. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 n.10 (1996) ("Police officers engaged in the
dangerous and difficult tasks associated with protecting the safety of our communities not
only confront the risk of physical harm but also face stressful circumstances that may give
rise to anxiety, depression, fear, or anger."); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 n.3
(1977) (per curiam) ('We recognize that the life of a police officer is a dangerous one.").
There are many more examples where the perception of dangerousness is implied rather than
explicitly discussed; among other things, that perception justifies the search incident-to-arrest
doctrine, Chmiel v California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969) (quoting Peston v United States,
376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)), and deference to an officer's use-of-force decisions, Graham v
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
61. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1047 (1983).
62. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam).
63. Long, 463 U.S. at 1047.
64. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
65. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205 (2002).
66. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
67. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 109 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
17 n. 15 (1968) (discussing the need for clear rules that an officer must apply "in the heat of
an unfolding encounter on the street").
69. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,235 (1983).
70. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1860 (2011).
71. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 109 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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sweep in a home;" searching" or frisking74 a vehicle; and making use-
of-force decisions;" among others.
Without disputing the need for alacrity, the Court has also
encouraged officers to pause long enough to knock and announce their
presence before they force entry into a house, noting that "an
unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by
the surprised resident."" At the same time, however, waiting too long
after knocking could "produc[e] preventable violence against the
officers in some cases, and the destruction of evidence in others.""
The Court has even estimated the amount of time necessary to destroy
evidence with some precision, guessing that fifteen to twenty seconds
is "sufficient" for someone in a house to "get[] to the bathroom or the
kitchen to start flushing [narcotics] down the drain." 8
When police officers do force entry, they are likely to cause some
damage "[s]ince most people keep their doors locked."" Once inside,
the inherent dangerousness of the situation justifies officers in
exercising "unquestioned command" by detaining occupants who
might otherwise attempt to flee, harm officers, or refuse to facilitate
the search." This need is particularly acute when the search warrant
involves suspected narcotics." Handcuffs, of course, are one way to
"minimize[] the risk of harm to both officers and occupants." 2
Officers can restrict an individual's movement even outside the
execution of a search warrant. Such control is also necessary-and
expected-during traffic stops" and at the scene of any "crime, arrest,
or investigation."" But the Court has not found the exercise of control
to be a perfect solution; until recently, the Court generalized about the
circumstances that followed the arrest of a vehicle occupant by stating
that "articles inside ... the passenger compartment of an automobile
72. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
73. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
74. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983).
75. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
76. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006); see also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967) (noting the danger of entering without knocking).
77. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595.
78. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 40 (2003) (calling the estimate "not ... an
unrealistic guess").
79. Id. at 37.
80. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 703 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
81. Summers, 452 U.S. at 703.
82. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100.
83. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 325 (2009).
84. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007).
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are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which
an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
ite[m].'". It concluded that the same applied in the arrest of recent
vehicle occupants" before eventually changing course and rejecting the
generalization for both current and recent vehicle occupants."
The Court also uses its understanding of police practices in part
to determine whether regulation would undermine or complement law
enforcement goals. Fear of "appreciably impair[ing]" "[e]ffective law
enforcement" has led the Court to permit officers to search any
containers in a vehicle if they have probable cause that the vehicle
itself contains contraband." In the arrest context, officers may make a
felony arrest without a warrant or exigent circumstances because the
Court believes that a contrary rule would "hamper effective law
enforcement."" At the same time, however, the Court refused to allow
officers who lack a warrant or exigent circumstances to force entry
into a suspect's home to make a felony arrest even when there is
probable cause, in part because of "the absence of any evidence that
effective law enforcement has suffered" in the states that require a
warrant or exigent circumstances." Similarly, the Court requires
officers to obtain a search warrant before forcing entry into the home
of a third party when they have probable cause to arrest an individual
believed to be in the home, holding that such a requirement "will not
significantly impede effective law enforcement efforts.""
At times, the Court adopts a rule specifically intended to curtail a
particular police practice. The exclusionary rule, which permits the
suppression of evidence seized in contravention of the Constitution,
serves as a particularly cogent example. The modem exclusionary rule
is premised solely on its ability "to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations."92 Here, the Court has adopted the view, at least implicitly,
that officers will respond if courts reduce or eliminate the possibility
of conviction. When it opines that a particular application of the
exclusionary rule will or will not deter police conduct, the Court is
85. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (alteration in original) (quoting
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
86. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 621 (2004) ("In all relevant aspects, the
arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety
and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle.").
87. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
88. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999).
89. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,431 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Payton v. NewYork, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980).
91. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221 (1981).
92. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011).
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making an unsupported factual assertion about both the information
available to officers and about their motivations."
The Court also makes statements about law enforcement officers
themselves. It credits officers with special knowledge and insight on a
range of topics, including an "almost instinctive" ability to distinguish
between questions that they need to ask in order to ensure their own
safety and questions intended to obtain testimonial evidence." Further,
officers who observe even facially lawful conduct are capable of
identifying characteristics of imminent danger" or criminality."
Indeed, the Court has stated that the "experience and specialized
training" that officers receive permit them "to make inferences from
and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that
'might well elude an untrained person."'" At the same time, however,
officers "have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance
the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront."'
The Court has only rarely credited fears that police officers will
attempt to circumscribe the constitutional limits to their authority.
Given the "increasing professionalism of police forces," the Court has
asserted that "police forces across the United States take the
constitutional rights of citizens seriously."" In Davis v United States,
the Court stated, "Responsible law-enforcement officers ... take care
to learn 'what is required of them' under Fourth Amendment precedent
and ... conform their conduct to these rules."'" So, for example,
officers who seek authorization for a wiretap do so only to detect
"crime-related conversations."'1  Notably, however, the Court has
suggested that police are more likely to engage in gamesmanship than
court employees.'02
93. See, eg., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 & n.4 (2009) (stating that
the risk to convictions may deter "deliberate, reckless, . . . grossly negligent conduct, or ...
recurring or systemic negligence," but not isolated acts of mere negligence).
94. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006).
95. Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 991 (2012) ("[T]here are many circumstances in
which lawful conduct may portend imminent violence.").
96. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411,417-18 (1981).
97. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at
418).
98. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979).
99. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (2006).
100. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011) (quoting Hudson, 547 US. at 599).
101. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006).
102. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009).
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Further, the Court has not generally been sympathetic to the
possibility that officers will abuse the powers that the Constitution
clearly grants. In Atwater v City ofLago Vista, for example, the Court
held that officers could constitutionally make an arrest for any criminal
infraction, even those punishable only by a fine.' That decision was
motivated in part by the understanding that officers had not yet abused
their discretion by causing "anything like an epidemic of unnecessary
minor-offense arrests."" Similarly, the Court held that statements
elicited in violation of Massiab v United States-which forbids
officers from obtaining a defendant's testimony after the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches-may still be used to impeach
the defendant." Because officers already have "significant incentive
to ensure that they ... comply with the Constitution's demands," the
Court held, not allowing the statements to be used for impeachment
would have no deterrent value.'
At times, the Court indicates that police are motivated to take or
refrain from action based not out of professionalism or altruism, but
because of their limited resources or other practical obstacles. In
linois v Lidster, the Court permitted officers to conduct roadblocks
intended to gather information about a criminal incident, noting that
"[p]ractical considerations-namely, limited police resources and
community hostility to related traffic tieups"-made the
"proliferation" of such roadblocks unlikely.o' Similarly, in Florida v
Powell, the Court concluded that even if the courts did permit police
departments to change the way they issued Manda warnings, the
agencies were unlikely to do so because such a change would impose
litigation risks."'
Though it typically projects a positive view of law enforcement as
unlikely to engage in gamesmanship,'" the Court has acknowledged
the possibility that raising the burdens of satisfying particular rules
will drive officers to find ways around those rules. In this vein, the
Court has rejected the idea that the existence of probable cause should
103. 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
104. Id. at 353.
105. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009).
106. Id.
107. 540 U.S. 419,426 (2004).
108. 559 U.S. 50, 62-64 (2010). The Court quoted the amicus brief of the United
States, but that brief contributed more in the way of persuasive language than factual support;
it mentioned only that federal agencies had not "relax[ed] their Miunda practices." Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (No. 08-
1175).
109. See supm notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
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be limited "to offenses closely related to (and supported by the same
facts as) those identified by the arresting officer," stating that under
such a rule, police officers would either cease providing the reasons
that underlie their arrest decision or "simply give every reason for
which probable cause could conceivably exist.""' In the same context,
the Court has suggested that judicial review of an officer's subjective
intent would deter officers from making arrests or taking other actions
that benefit society."' And if the Constitution imposed more
demanding requirements before a search warrant could issue, the
Court has said that "police might well resort to warrantless searches,
with the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the
Warrant Clause that might develop at the time of the search."12
Similarly, the Court has posited reasons why officers would prefer one
course of action over another; in Kentucky v KIng, the Court gave five
reasons why an officer with probable cause to search a house may
prefer to conduct a consensual knock-and-talk instead of obtaining and
serving a search warrant."' On rare occasions, the Court has expressed
concern about police gamesmanship. In Brendlin v Califomia, the
Court held that passengers in a stopped car were seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes; holding otherwise, the Court said, would create
an incentive for officers to conduct suspicionless traffic stops to find
evidence that could be used against the passengers, who would lack
standing to object to the seizure." 4
III. POLICING THE COURT'S USE OF LEGISLATIVE FACTS
In the previous Part, I identified a nonexhaustive set of factual
statements that the Court has made in the context of regulating police,
demonstrating that, although the Court has supported some of its
assertions about law enforcement, the majority go unsupported. With
regard to the constitutional regulation of police, as elsewhere, it may
well be true that "[m]uch of our law is based on wrong assumptions
about legislative facts.""' Though an exhaustive analysis of the
practice is beyond the scope of this Article, this Part seeks to draw
readers' attention to the Court's use of questionable factual predicates.
110. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155 (2004).
111. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008).
112. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,236 (1983).
113. 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1860-61 (2011).
114. 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007).
115. Davis, supra note 59, at 15.
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To demonstrate my point, I provide detailed examples from three
important Fourth Amendment doctrines: the deference with which
courts review police uses of force, the absence of any requirement that
officers inform individuals of the right to refuse consent to a search,
and the deterrence justification for the exclusionary rule. Each of
these rules has sparked considerable controversy among commentators
on doctrinal or normative grounds, but the factual suppositions that
underlie the rules have thus far largely evaded academic scrutiny.
A. Police Uses ofForce
In the context of determining whether a police use of force was
constitutionally permissible, the Court has concluded that the
circumstances in which police use force justify deference to the
officers' decisions. Reviewing the data on use-of-force incidents
reveals an apparent gap; only a small minority play out the way that the
Court envisions.
One of the realities of modem law enforcement is "the potential
for suspect resistance and police use of or threatened use of force.""'
To help lower courts evaluate whether a given use of force was
constitutionally permissible, the Court has established a totality-of-the-
circumstances reasonableness test that "is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application.""' Instead, the inquiry demands
"careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case," with particular attention to "the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.""' However, "[t]he calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers
are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.""' Deference to officer
judgments is justified by the inherent nature of use-of-force incidents:
the compressed time in which an officer must decide whether to use
116. Office of Justice Programs, Use of Force, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty-tp&tid=703 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) (calling that
potential an "essential element" of law enforcement operations).
117. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 559 (1979)).
118. Id. That these factors have been soundly criticized as "irrelevant and prejudicial"
demonstrates that the Court does not have a sound understanding of how officers make use-
of-force decisions. Harmon, supa note 14, at 1123.
119. Grdham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
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force, determine what type of force to use, and translate those
decisions into action.
Were some future anthropologists to turn to the federal reporters
to form an opinion about the environment in which law enforcement
officers use force, they would have little choice but to conclude that
those "circumstances [were] tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,"
requiring "split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force that is
necessary."20  Since the Supreme Court first introduced that
description in 1989, federal district and circuit courts have repeated it
on more than 2300 occasions.m' It features widely in briefs and trial
court documents and has made its way into federal and state pattern
jury instructions.'22 It is, by any measure, the accepted depiction of the
environment in which police officers use force.
As a description, though, this account is misleading. To see why,
we must first understand more about (1) the manner in which officers
approach civilian encounters, (2) typical uses of force, and (3) the
types of resistance that force is most often used to overcome. In the
world of policing, few things are more important than officer safety.
From the time they are in the police academy, officers are taught that
their single overriding goal every day is going home at the end of the
shift.' One of the most popular police training texts instructs officers
to make tactical thinking a constant part of their working lives by
considering, as they approach each encounter, their response to
possible resistance.124  Police operating procedures enshrine the
120. Id. at 397.
121. A WestlawNext search for "split-second judgments" in the same paragraph as
"use of force" yields these results. This description of the environment in which police
officers make decisions appears in just under 1600 briefs and more than 3000 trial court
documents.
122. 3 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL EVIDENCE 1-41
(4th ed. 2007) (citing Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999)); Harmon, supra note
14, at 1144 n. 119 (citing MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 4.40 (2013)); Ninth Circuit Jury Instructions Comm.,
Ninth Cicuit Manual ofModelJuryInstructions: Civil, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
186 (2006), http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Civil
JuryInstructions_2013_10.pdf. Some state courts have adopted this language into their
model instructions as well. E.g., Civil Jury Instructions: 5.1-1 Use of Excessive Folre
(Violation of 42 US.C 1983), STATE OF CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH § 5.1-1 (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/Civil/part5/5.1-1.htn.
123. PETER MOSKOS, Cop IN THE HOOD 22 (2008).
124. RONALD J. ADAMS ET AL., STREET SURVIVAL: TACTICS FOR ARMED ENCOUNTERS
155 (1980) ("As you approach any situation, you want to be in the habit of looking for cover,
so you can react automatically to reach it should trouble erupt."); id. at 395 ("On patrol, you
can turn 'routine' observation into a survival-oriented game. As you watch people in a crowd
or on the sidewalk, pick out certain ones at random and assume that they are armed suspects.
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concept of tactical awareness.125 Suspicion is not reserved for suspects;
a safety-conscious officer approaches witnesses and victims with
similar care.12 An officer will take steps to control a scene well before
they initiate contact with someone. For example, an officer who is
going to conduct a traffic stop may delay by following the target
vehicle until they reach an area that will provide some tactical
advantage.' Officers are trained to approach pedestrian stops in a
similar manner; they select the location and environment, so far as
possible, before commanding a civilian to stop.' When force is used,
it has been premeditated; the situation has already been shaped by the
officer's preparation and tactical approach.'29
Officers use force to overcome civilian resistance, and most
agencies instruct officers to use force in proportion to the amount of
resistance offered.'" Most civilians, of course, do not resist at all,
How would you deploy to approach them? What cover might you use? How could you best
protect yourself and/or shoot back if they suddenly displayed aggressive behavior?").
125. Denver Police Department Operations Manual, DENVER POLICE DEP'T
§105.01(1)a. (Mar. 2010), http://www.denvergov.org/Portals/720/documents/Operations
Manual/105.pdf ("Officers should ensure that they do not engage in unreasonable actions that
precipitate the use of force as a result of tactical, strategic, and procedural errors that place
themselves or others in jeopardy.").
126. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 124, at 75 (describing how to interview a witness or
complainant).
127. Id. at 76-79. Ronald J. Adams and others accompany their tactical suggestions
with the warning: "Dangerous motorists and passengers cannot always be identified in
advance. [That] is why it is so critical to controlyour stop." Id. at 77; CHARLES REMSBERG,
THE TACTICAL EDGE: SURVIVING HIGH-RISK PATROL 274-77 (1986); see also Motor Vehicle
Stops: Model Policy, Mo. POLICE CHIEFS § III.A (2002), http://www.mopca.com/mpca.nsf/
ContentPage.xsp?action=openDocument&documentld=F 1642CC8306279AF86257708005
86E6D (follow "Motor Vehicle Stops" hyperlink under "Volume Two") ("2. Once an initial
decision has been made to stop a motorist, the officer shall select an area that provides
reasonable safety .... 3. When a location has been selected for the stop, the officer shall
notify the communications center of [the stop]. 4. At the desired location, the officer should
signal the operator to stop .... ); Strategic Servs. Div., Manual of Policy and Procedure,
PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU 134 (Jan. 2010), http://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/
32482 ("Before making a traffic stop, [the officer shall] give the following information by
voice or [in-car computer]: 1. Unit number and [radio signal indicating a traffic stop].
2. Vehicle license plate or description. 3. Location.").
128. See, e.g., ADAMS ETAL., supr note 124, at 69-76.
129. Indeed, a leading scholar has suggested that courts take into account the totality
of officer actions leading up to the use of force, rather than focusing exclusively on the point
at which force was used. Carl B. Klockars, A Theory ofExcessive Force and Its Control, h7
POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 1, 8-10
(William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
130. As early as the 1960s, law enforcement agencies have used "force matrices" to
communicate when they expect officers to use force. KAREN M. HESS & CHRISTINE HESS
ORTHMANN, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 235 (9th ed. 2010). Force matrices are presented in
various ways, but all instruct officers which types of force are appropriate to overcome
certain types of resistance. See id at 236 (providing examples of both a linear force matrix
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making the use of force relatively rare: in 2008, officers used or
threatened force in less than 2% of approximately forty million civilian
interactions.'' Passive resistance-nonresponsiveness to an officer's
orders'-and active resistance-nonviolent physical resistance such
as tensing up, pulling away, or fleeing'3-are by far the most common
types of opposition that officers must overcome.13 Correspondingly,
the most common officer responses involve the use of nonphysical
force: shouting, cursing, and threats of force.' When officers do use
physical force, they use relatively little. A recent Department of
Justice report documents that the most common use of physical force
involves pushing or grabbing.' This finding is fully consistent with
prior research, all of which suggests that, when officers use force, the
least severe force options are the most commonly used.' For
example, one study found that police use of force "consist[s] almost
exclusively of grabbing and restraining,"3 and another concluded that
"84 percent of forcible incidents [are limited to] grabb[ing], push[ing],
or restrain[ing] a citizen."'" Injuries are relatively uncommon, and
those injuries that officers cause are typically minor.'40
and a circular force matrix); Ross Wolf et al., Police Use of Force and the Cumulative Force
Factor, 32 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 739, 744 fig. 1 (2009) (displaying
a ladder-style force matrix); John G. Peters, Jr. & Michael A. Brave, Force Continuums Are
They Still Needed, POLICE & SECURITY NEWS, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 1, 3, available at
http://ecdlaw.info/outlines/forcecontinuums.pdf.
131. Christine Eith & Matthew R. Durose, Contacts Between Police and the Public,
2008, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 11 (Oct. 2011), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cpp08.pdf.
132. Going limp is the classic example of passive resistance. See, e g., Amnesty Am.
v. Town of West Hartford, 361 E3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing "passive resistance
techniques" employed by antiabortion protestors).
133. See, eg., Chaney v. City of Orlando, 291 F. App'x 238, 244 (11th Cir. 2008)
(noting the distinction drawn by the Orlando Police Department between passive resistance
and active resistance).
134. GEOFFREY P ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE OF
FORCE: OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND RECIPROCITY 88-93 (2004).
135. Eith & Durose, supra note 131, at 11-13.
136. Id. at 12-13.
137. Geoffrey P Alpert & Roger G. Dunham, The Force Factor: Measuring and
Assessing Police Use of Force and Suspect Resistance, in USE OF FORCE BY POLICE:
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 45,45-47 (1999).
138. Robert E. Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on
Police Use ofForce, i POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE
OF FORCE, supra note 129, at 23, 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Kenneth Adams, Measuring the Prevalence of Police Abuse of Force, in POLICE
VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE, supm note 129, at
52,62.
140. Nat'l Inst. of Justice & Bureau of Justice Statistics, Executive Summary, in USE
OF FORCE BY POLICE: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA, supra note 137, at vii, viii.
20 14] 867
TULANE LAWREVIEW
The vast majority of the time, then, officers use force
aggressively, not defensively. That is, they act forcefully to establish
control over a suspect rather than to defend themselves, a third party,
or the suspect from some immrinent harm. 4' Injury to the officer-
which can be uncommon even when police use force to defend
themselves' 42-is unlikely. Considering that the vast majority of use-
of-force incidents involve the use of aggressive force by police
officers-typified by tactical preparation, a degree of premeditation,
low levels of resistance, low levels of force, and a low probability of
injury-the Court's description of "split-second judgments" is simply
wrong almost all the time.'43 When someone goes limp, pulls away, or
turns to run, officers have time to think through their response.
Indeed, departmental training or policies might well requre, or at least
suggest, a tactical delay, the better to consider the range of options
available.'" The Portland Police Bureau, for example, advises officers
to be careful when moving people who are passively resisting, noting
that "[1]ifting and/or carrying people can pose a safety risk and should
be avoided whenever safer options are available and appropriate."'
Similarly, the same agency instructs its officers not to try to overtake a
running suspect by themselves; instead, they should "keep the suspect
in sight" until it is safe to make an arrest."' In the meantime, they are
to provide the dispatcher with information about the suspect and the
chase itself.'47
141. I do not mean to suggest that the use of aggressive force is unjustified or in any
way illegitimate. In these situations, officers are promoting the state's interest in
apprehending suspects; the use of force is "necessary to effectuate criminal proceedings
against a suspect." Harmon, supra note 14, at 1152.
142. Most assaults on officers result in no or minor injuries. The FBI reports that over
the last ten years, between 71.7% and 74.1% of assaults on officers resulted in no or minor
injuries. Table 70: Law Enforcement Officers Assaultea FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/leoka/leoka-2010/tables/table70-leo-assaulted-type-weapon-percent-injured-0 1-
10.xls (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). Some departments report even lower rates of injury. See
Annual Report 2010: A Year in Review, CI. POLICE DEP'T 60 (2011), https://portal.chicago
police.org/portal/page/portalClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Annual%2OReports/10
AR.pdf (reporting no or minor injuries in 98.6% of assaults on officers in 2009 and 2010).
143. This is true even if we acknowledge that a situation may be "tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving," Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989), a description so vague that it
may be fairly applied to all officer/civilian encounters and any other stressful environment,
from a first date to a high-stakes poker game.
144. See Strategic Servs. Div., Manual of Policy and Procedure, PORTLAND POLICE
BUREAU § 630.15 (July 2006), http://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/126296.
145. Strategic Servs. Div., Manual of Policy and Procedure, PORTLAND POLICE
BUREAU 199 (Mar. 2006), http://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/1 17876.




I do not want to overstate my point; it is certainly true that the
time in which an officer must make a force decision can be
compressed, particularly in cases where the officer is using force
defensively rather than aggressively. It is also true that police work
itself is often tense and uncertain, with the potential to change
dramatically from moment to moment. With characteristic
hypervigilance, officers must remain alert to the possibility that
someone who has gone limp could still reach to their waistband for a
weapon or that a running suspect may turn and fight.'48 However, in
responding to the resistance actually presented, the realities of police
violence are such that the circumstances in which officers must make a
truly split-second decision are highly unusual, which militates against
the Supreme Court's generalization.
B. Consent Searches
The Court has rejected procedural protections in the consent-
search context, refusing to require that officers advise the individuals
whom they wish to search of the right to withhold consent. The Court
has justified the refusal in part with the explanation that officers would
find it "thoroughly impractical" to issue a Mimnda-like consent
warning.'49 As with use-of-force situations, though, analyzing when
and how officers ask for consent calls into question the accuracy of the
Court's assertion in the vast majority of cases.
Throughout the criminal law, consent functions as an effective
bypass mechanism, an efficient end run that either satisfies or waives
whole swaths of constitutional text. An amorphous concept, consent
can convert what would be an unlawful suspicionless seizure into a
permissible consensual encounter' and can render admissible what
may otherwise be a presumptively coerced confession."' In the
context of warrantless Fourth Amendment searches, consent represents
a deft dodge around the complicated maze of rules that have grown up
around-and perhaps in an attempt to define-the standard of
reasonableness. And it is quite a popular dodge; although precise data
are unavailable, consent searches are reputedly the most commonly
148. See Richard Fairburn, Cooperk Colors: A Sinple System for Situational
Awareness, POLICEONECOM (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.policeone.com/police-trainers/
articles/2188253-Cooper-s-colors-A-simple-system-for-situational-awareness/ (advising
officers to be at "condition White" only when asleep).
149. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973).
150. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-36 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1980).
151. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20 14] 869
TULANELA WREVIEW
exercised exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement,'52
estimated to make up at least 90% of warrantless searches by law
enforcement officers.'
And why not? It is almost ludicrously easy for a prosecutor to
establish that an encounter or search was consensual and difficult for a
defendant to prove that it was not.'" That difficulty arises in part from
the lack of procedural protections in consent-search situations. In
Schneckloth v Bustamonte, the Court rejected a rule that required the
government to demonstrate that the consenting individual Imew they
had the right to refuse consent.' Although the Court recognized that
"[o]ne alternative that would go far toward proving that the subject of a
search did know he had a right to refuse consent would be to advise
him of that right before eliciting his consent," it rejected such a
requirement as "thoroughly impractical."'"' The Court described its
view of when officers asked for consent in vague terms, stating:
Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of
law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or in a
person's home or office, and under informal and unstructured
conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search
may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police
152. 4 LAFAvE, supm note 53, § 8.1, at 4-5; JOHN M. MACDONALD & JERRY KENNEDY,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF DRUG OFFENSES 276 (1983). There are some limited instances
in which more precise data are available. See, eg., Molly Totman & Dwight Steward,
Searching for Consent An Analysis of Racial Profiling Data in Texas, ACLU OF TEX. 2 (Feb.
17, 2006), http://www.aclutx.org/download/4/ (reporting that consent searches made up
approximately 30% of all searches conducted at traffic stops in Texas during 2004).
153. Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrne, 80 IND. L.J. 773,773(2005).
154. Steinbock, supm note 22, at 541.
155. 412 U.S. 218,223,230(1973).
156. Id at 231. The practicality point is the first and last justification the Court
offered in its opinion, but it also provided additional reasons for its holding. The Court read
prior cases to mean that an individual can voluntarily consent even when ignorant of their
right to refuse consent. Id. at 233-34. It concluded that the right to refuse consent, as a
Fourth Amendment right, was of a "wholly different order," id at 242, from "those rights that
protect a fair criminal trial" and so did not require the same "'knowing' and 'intelligent'
waiver, id at 236. Further, the Court's description reflects its conception of consensual
encounters as essentially free of inherent coercion. "Implicit in [consensual encounter] cases
is the assumption that when an individual agrees to police requests to engage in conversation,
she is not submitting to a 'show of authority' of the kind that would convey the message that
she is not free to leave." Steinbock, supra note 22, at 515. It is this assumption that has
received the lion's share of academic criticism. See, eg., Janice Nadler & J.D. Trout, The
Language of Consent in Police Encounters, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LINGUISTICS AND LAW
326, 326 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012) ("By ignoring the pragmatic
features of the police-citizen encounter, judges are engaging in a systematic denial of the
reality of the social meaning underlying these encounters, and are thereby constructing a
collective legal myth designed to support current police practices in the 'war on drugs."').
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questioning. The police may seek to investigate further suspicious
circumstances or to follow up leads developed in questioning persons at
the scene of a crime.'
As the Court articulated it, the environment in which police ask for
consent simply was "a far cry from the structured atmosphere of a
trial" and "immeasurably far removed" from custodial interrogation,"
both circumstances where it had approved of explicit warnings. Here,
in contrast, requiring officers to warn individuals that they had the
right to refuse consent would "hamper the traditional function of
police officers in investigating crime."9
Similar reasoning motivated the Court to come to a similar
conclusion some twenty-three years later when it held in Ohio v
Robmette that police officers did not have to inform a lawfully seized
individual that the seizure had ended-that they were "free to go"-
before asking for consent to search." Quoting from Schneckloth, the
majority concluded its opinion by stating that "it [would] be unrealistic
to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free
to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.""' And six
years after that, the Court cited Schneckloth and Robinette when it
rejected a rule that effectively required officers engaged in drug
interdiction on cross-country buses to inform passengers that they
could refuse to consent to the search requests.'62
Much ink has been spilled over the concept of consent, most of it
in the argument that true voluntariness is unlikely in officer/civilian
encounters. Scholars and popular-media commentators have roundly
criticized the way that the courts have failed to appreciate the patently
asymmetrical power dynamic between an armed authority figure and a
submissive civilian, as well as the ease with which the doctrines of
consensual encounters and consensual searches-practically related if
conceptually distinct-can be pressed into service as tools of racial
157. Schneckloth,412 U.S. at 231-32.
15 8. Id.
159. Id. at 232 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966)). The Court did
not do a good job of explaining in clear terms what drove its perception of impracticality,
leading Justice Marshall, writing in dissent in Schneckloth, to "conclude ... that when the
Court speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the police to
capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not
achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights." Id at 288
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996).
161. Id.at39-40.
162. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002).
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profiling' in a way that substantially undermines public faith in law
enforcement.'" My criticism is quite distinct and focuses on the
Court's use of empirical language to describe the impracticality of
consent warnings. The Court used an apparently factual assertion to
smuggle in a normative preference about law enforcement, but the two
are at odds with each other. The statement that practical difficulties
make it unreasonable to require officers to issue consent warnings is
highly suspect.
Regardless of whether the circumstances that prompted the police
interest "develop[ed] quickly" or resulted from "a logical extension of
investigative police questioning,"' there is no pressing exigency that
precludes a consent warning. Certainly there is no safety rationale for
such preclusion. Consent, in many cases, follows on the heels of a
detention because asking for consent during the stop risks
impermissibly extending it.' When this is true, the officer has either
conducted a pat down as early into the interaction as possible' or
concluded that they lack reasonable suspicion that the detainee is
armed or dangerous.' By the time the officer ends the detention and
asks for consent, they have "no further need to control the scene"'
because they have already taken steps to make it as safe as they can.
Even when there is no detention-and thus no opportunity to frisk-
officers are trained to approach each encounter tactically, taking steps
163. Nadler & Trout, supra note 156, at 327-28; Steinbock, supra note 22, at 510; see
also Justin Peters, How About a Fiendly Frislng.: The Myth of the "Consensual" Police
Encounter, SLATE (Nov. 30, 2012, 2:02 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2012/
1 1/30/stop__andfrisk floridaistheresuchthingas-a-consensual-policeencounter.htm
("Florida is making it harder for you to carry drugs by making it easier for the police to stop
you for any reason. There's nothing consensual about that.").
164. Jacinta M. Gau, Consent Searches as a 7hrat to Procedural Justice and Police
Legitimacy: An Analysis of Consent Requests During Traffic Stops, 24 CRIM. JUST. Po'Y
REv 759 (2012).
165. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,232(1973).
166. Asking for consent or taking other actions that prolong the detention beyond the
time "reasonably required to complete" the purposes of the detention can render unreasonable
an initially justified stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,407 (2005).
167. Cf ADAMS ETAL., supra note 124, at 112 ("From the outset, you want to maintain
an offensive position, not a defensive one." (emphasis omitted)).
168. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). At times, the officer may conduct a search
even if they cannot satisfy the legal standard by articulating reasonable suspicion, as when
they respond to an anonymous call about a person with a gun. Such an anonymous call will
not support reasonable suspicion, Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), but, for their own
safety, officers may still "search the suspect, knowing that any case probably would not hold
up in court." MOSKOS, supra note 123, at 116.
169. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 325 (2009) (stating that in the context of
traffic stops, "[n]ormally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the
scene").
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to maximize safety even before initiating contact.'" Regardless of
whether the encounter is consensual or involuntary, police are taught to
maintain their awareness vigilantly and to take pains to mitigate
potential threats.' If there are multiple civilians on scene, as with a
vehicle stop, the officer may request backup before interacting with
the group or asking for consent to search.172  Some departments train
officers to call for backup when they intend to ask for consent to
search even a single civilian and to not search until backup arrives.'73
These measures ensure that at the point at which officers ask for
consent, they have taken appropriate precautions to make the
environment safe as they can.
In addition to what we might call the environmental realities, the
fact that certain courts, legislatures, and law enforcement agencies
require officers to provide consent warnings also supports the
conclusion that the Court erred by describing such warnings as
"thoroughly impractical." For more than a quarter century, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey interpreted a provision of the state
constitution textually identical to the Fourth Amendment 4 to require
police officers to provide consent warnings to individuals they wanted
to search.' The Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted a similar
requirement with regard to house searches,"' again under a state
constitutional provision textually identical to the Fourth Amendment.'7
170. See supra notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
171. REMSBERG, supra note 127, at 295.
172. See id. ("With multiple suspects, wait for backup.").
173. This was the case in the department that I worked for. The tactical ideal was to
have at least one more officer than civilian on scene.
174. Compaw N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to
be seized."), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.").
175. State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975). The New Jersey Supreme Court later
banned the practice of suspicionless consent searches altogether, expressing concerns about
racial profiling and deep skepticism that "a consent to search ... truly can be voluntary or
otherwise reasonable" even after being warned of the right to refuse consent. State v. Carty,
790 A.2d 903, 911 (N.J. 2002).
176. State v. Brown, 156 S.W3d 722, 724 (Ark. 2004).
177. Compar ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15 ("The right of the people of this State to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, except upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
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A Colorado statute requires that law enforcement officers inform the
subject that they are "being asked to voluntarily consent to a search"
and that they have "the right to refuse the request to search."' 8 The
targeted individual must consent verbally or in writing before the
officer is allowed to search."' Similar legislation was proposed and
passed in Texas before being vetoed by Governor Rick Perry.'"
Some police agencies have determined that consent warnings are
not only plausible, but mandatory even when they are not required by
state law. The Austin Police Department, one of the largest police
departments in the country,'' now requires officers both to inform
civilians that they may withhold their consent and to obtain written
consent before conducting a vehicle search.'82 The Chicago Police
Department has adopted a more limited policy, requiring written
consent (or the presence of a supervisor) before an officer may
conduct a consent search of a residence or private property other than
vehicles.' For vehicles, officers are encouraged to have civilians fill
out written consent forms that include a consent warning.'" Further,
some police training manuals suggest that officers provide consent
warnings even in the absence of a legal or administrative directive. A
popular text dedicated to the investigation of drug crimes states that a
consent warning "is not legally required in all attempts to get a consent
to search, but it is helpful to so advise every suspect, as it not only
person or thing to be seized."), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.").
178. COLO. REv STAT. § 16-3-310(1) (2013).
17 9. Id.
180. S.B. 1195, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); Proclamation by the Governor of
the State of Texas, Tex. S. Journal, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5129 (May 30, 2005) (vetoing the
bill in part because there was "insufficient information available ... to determine whether
signed or [video or audio recorded] consent requirements place too onerous a burden on law
enforcement").
181. Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. app. tbl.8 (July 2011), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/csllea08.pdf.
182. See Patrick George, Acevedo: Officers Need Written Consent for Vehicle
Searches, STATESMAN.COM (July 19, 2012, 9:20 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/
news/locallacevedo-officers-need-written-consent-for-vehicl-1/nRqF3/.
183. Philip J. Cline, Consent To Search Incidents: Special Order S04-19-01, Cm.
POLICE DEP'T § II C-D (June 1, 2007), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a
57be2-12a76cel-24512-a773-3e562b92ee0b01 7f.html?hltrue.
184. Consent To Search Fonn CPD-11.483, Cm. POLICE DEP'T, http://directives.
chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-I 1.483.pdf (last updated May 2007).
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helps balance the facts in favor of a voluntary consent but will save a
consent given during an unlawful detention or arrest."'
Both the circumstances in which officers ask for consent and the
practices of a significant minority of police departments raise doubts
about the Court's conclusion that it is impractical to demand that
officers issue a consent warning. There may be other social and legal
justifications for or against consent searches,'8 but a practical bar
seems unlikely.
C The Exclusionary Rule
The modem incarnation of the exclusionary rule is firmly
grounded in a deterrence rationale, with the Court implicitly but
necessarily concluding that reducing or eliminating the possibility of a
conviction by suppressing evidence will matter to police officers, who
are personally invested in obtaining convictions. A gap exists here
because officers do not concern themselves with exclusion.
The exclusionary rule allows for the suppression of illegally
gathered evidence when the social costs of suppression-the dangers
of "setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large"-are outweighed
by the value of deterring future illegality by police.'8 The Court now
views the rule cautiously, noting that the "[s]uppression of evidence
. . . has always been [its] last resort, not [its] first impulse."' Over the
past forty years, scholars have hotly debated the origins and precise
scope of the exclusionary rule.' Perhaps the most intense point of
academic contention is the rule's theoretical justification: whether it is
185. MACDONALD& KENNEDY, supra note 152, at 278.
186. There remains a difference between the lack of a legal requirement to consent and
the lack of a social expectation of acquiescence, see Nadler & Trout, supra note 156, at 332,
and it seems likely that the social pressure will largely survive even when the individual has
been informed that they have no legalobligation to consent. Consider the high rate at which
suspects waive their Miranda rights. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation
M the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects ofMiranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 859
(1996) (reporting more than 83% of suspects waived Mianda); Kit Kinports, The Supreme
Courth Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 379-80
(2011) ("[T]he overwhelming majority of suspects waive their rights and agree to talk to the
police without the assistance of counsel.").
187. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
188. Id
189. See generally Roger Roots, The Onghalist Case for the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONz. L. REv. 1 (2009/10) (examining the application of exclusion-
like remedies during the Founding Era); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Orgins, Development and Futue of the Exclusionary Rule in Seawh-and-




a constitutional directive, a prudential rule, or something else
altogether.' A related body of literature, nearly as intense and only
slightly smaller, has contested that the suppression of evidence and the
corresponding elimination or reduction of the possibility of conviction
can deter police misconduct."' Many commentators have pointed out
the lack of evidence for the proposition that the exclusion of evidence
has any real deterrent value; such an effect must be taken "largely [as]
a matter of faith."'" Drawing on existing criticisms of the exclusionary
rule, Eugene R. Milhizer recently enumerated seven reasons to be
skeptical of the rule's deterrent effect: (1) officers' violations are often
unintentional rather than malicious, (2) exclusion is typically too
remote or attenuated from the violation, (3) a majority of the most
questionable seizures avoid judicial review by being "buried" by police
or during the plea bargaining process, (4) officers who commit
violations can avoid exclusion by being deceptive, (5) the violating
officer may never be told that their evidence was suppressed,
(6) officers may find the effect of suppression on the potential for
conviction outweighed by the effect of searching and arresting the
defendant, and (7) officers can avoid suppression by gaming the legal
doctrines surrounding the exclusionary rule, such as standing
requirements.'
I do no more than dip a toe in the turbulent waters of the debate; I
remain skeptical of the exclusionary rule's efficacy as a deterrent, but
not (just) for the reasons recited by Milhizer. While scholars have
done a creditable job of identifying problems with the rule, they either
190. See Brooks Holland, The ExclusionaryRule as Punishmen4 36 RUTGERS L. REC.
38 (2009); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REv. 665 (1970); Richard A. Posner, Rethinkng the Fourth Amendmeni 1981 SUP. CT.
REv 49 (198 1); Rohith V Srinivas, The Exclusionary Rule as Fourth Amendment Judicial
Review, 49 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 179, 182 (2012) (contending that the exclusionary rule is
"simply the form that judicial review takes in the Fourth Amendment context"); Stewart,
supra note 189.
191. See Kenneth W Starr & Audrey L. Maness, Reasonable Remedies and (or?) the
Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 373, 379-80 (2010) (contrasting the views of jurists
and scholars who doubt the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and seek to eliminate or
limit it from that ofjurists and scholars who support its continued application).
192. Dworkin, suple note 15, at 333; see alsoYale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause,"
"Good Faith,"and Beyona 69 IowA L. REv. 551, 613 (1984) (discussing the relationship
between probable cause and good faith in search-and-seizure cases); Posner, supra note 190,
at 54 ("No one actually knows how effective the exclusionary rule is as a deterrent."); James
E. Spiotto, Search and Seiure: An Empircal Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 243, 275-77 (1973) (concluding that the exclusionary rule is
not an effective deterrent of police misconduct).
193. Eugene R. Milhizer, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment
ExclusionaryRule, 211 MIL. L. REv. 211, 229-30 (2012).
876 [Vol. 88:847
POLICING FACTS
overlook or share the Court's foundational assumption that when
officers engage in investigative activity, their "focus is ... upon
obtaining convictions of those who commit crimes."'" I am not so
sure; officers are under no formal pressure to concern themselves with
convictions, and there is informal discouragement of such concern.
Consider first the formal mechanisms that could shape officer
interest. The most obvious, of course, is a supervisor's performance
evaluation of individual employee conduct. Officer evaluation forms
used by both large and small police departments do not mention, let
alone put weight on, convictions, though most include some evaluation
of arrests.' Even agencies that use-or previously used-hard quotas
that require officers to make a certain number of arrests or issue a
certain number of tickets in a given amount of time do not evaluate
their officers based on convictions.'" Nor do police management texts
encourage supervisors to consider convictions when evaluating officer
performance; most do not mention it at all. The most recent edition of
Supervision of Police Personnel advises supervisors to evaluate many
aspects of patrol officers' performance, including the quality of their
arrests, their report writing, and their poise in court, but it omits any
mention of conviction rates.'" In Police Performance Appraisals: A
Comparaive Pemspective, the authors list twelve "core competencies"
194. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998); see RICHARDA.
LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 22 (2008) (identifying conviction as the
goal of police interrogators). There is occasional disagreement, but it is rarely fully fleshed
out. See WILLIAM J. STUNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 220 (2011)
("[Slupression of illegally seized evidence is a particularly poor sanction to apply to the
police, because police officers lose nothing when evidence is excluded at defendants' trials.");
Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REv. 761, 795 (2012) ("The
exclusionary rule cannot work if officers do not care about securing convictions, and only
departments can make them care, whether through formal or informal incentives.").
195. NATHAN F. IANNONE ET AL., SUPERVISION OF POLICE PERSONNEL 234-35, 245-47
(7th ed. 2009) (containing copies of the Los Angeles Police Department Performance
Evaluation Report and the Palm Beach Police Department Sworn Employee Evaluation
Report); Balt. Police Dep't, Performance Evaluation Report, Form 397/98 (n.d.); Tallahassee
Police Dep't Employee Evaluation Form (on file with author); Truro Police Dep't, Employee
Performance Evaluation (Patrol Division), TowN OF TRURO, http://www.truropolice.org/On%
20Line%2OManuals/Performance%20Evaluations.pdf (last updated Apr. 7, 2005); Vienna
Police Dep't, Performance Appraisal Form, TOWN OF VIENNA, VA., http://www.viennava.gov/
DocumentCenter/Home/View/614 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). I was not able to obtain the
evaluation forms used by the NYPD or the Chicago Police Department, but conversations
with current and former officers establish that convictions play no role in officer evaluation at
those departments.
196. See SERDAR KENAN GuL & PAUL E. O'CONNELL, POLICE PERFORMANCE
APPRAISALS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 72 (2013) (describing a Washington, D.C., Police
Department performance evaluation plan).
197. IANNONE, supoanote 195, at 238-39.
20 14] 877
TULANE LAW REVIEW
upon which most police departments evaluate officers; convictions did
not make the list.'" Anecdotal reports make the same point.
Describing his tenure as a Baltimore police officer, Peter Moskos, a
professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, explains that officers
routinely make arrests that they know are unlikely to result in
conviction, writing, "[O]fficers are rewarded for arrests, not
convictions.""
Like the evaluation of individual officers, the success of a
particular police program is not measured by reference to the number
of convictions generated. Instead, law enforcement operations are
evaluated by referring to the number of arrests that they generate, the
reduction in crime generally or in particular types of crime, or less
quantifiable quality-of-life factors.2" This is particularly true in the era
of community-oriented policing, which tends to devalue the number of
arrests as an appropriate metric of performance.20 '
To be sure, not all police employees will be entirely uninterested
in seeing their arrestees successfully prosecuted; investigators and
detectives, particularly those in high-profile units like homicide or sex
crimes202 or in heavily publicized cases, may follow postarrest
dispositions more closely than uniformed patrol officers. This
observation does little to support the general deterrent value of the
exclusionary rule, though. Detectives and investigators make up a
small percentage of sworn personnel: only about 15% of officers even
in the largest police departments and typically less in smaller
departments. 203 In contrast, patrol officers-those whose regular duties
include responding to calls for service-make up between 60% and
198. GuL & O'CONNELL, supm note 196, at 60-62.
199. MosKos, supm note 123, at 59; see also id. at 55 (describing how officers in two
different jurisdictions-New York City and Baltimore-use low-level misdemeanor arrests as
a stand-alone solution to a problem, noting that "the point [of these] arrests is not to convict
people").
200. Kristin Ward et al., Measuring Excellence: Planning and Managing Evaluations
of Law Enforcement Initiatives, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (June 2007), http://www.cops.
usdoj.gov/Publications/e06072996-web.pdf (reporting on "the importance of program
evaluation to law enforcement" without even mentioning convictions).
201. See Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Law Enforcement in a Tme of Community
Polcing, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 539, 539-40 (1995).
202. LANNONE, supm note 195, at 239 (suggesting that supervisors may find it useful to
refer to conviction rates for "investigative personnel").
203. Brian A. Reaves & Matthew J. Hickman, Census of State and Local Law
Enforement Agencies, 2000, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. 2 (Oct. 2002), http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cslleaOO.pdf.; see also Raymond W Kelly, Crime andEnforement
Activity in New York City, CITY OF N.Y. POLICE DEP'T app. C-1 (2012), http://www.nyc.
gov/htrnl/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis-and-planning/yearend2O 11enforcementreport.pdf
(estimating detectives make up 14.4% of the NYPD).
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90% of sworn employees in a given department.2 This breakdown
matters because it is the patrol officers, not investigators, who have the
most impact on whether an arrest is made and conviction obtained.
According to a RAND Corporation study, investigators are responsible
for "clearing" less than 3% of criminal incidents. 205 And, though not
itself entirely conclusive, a Westlaw search is telling: searching for
federal district court cases in which the phrase "exclusionary rule"
appears with the word "officer" or "deputy" returns more than twice as
many results as searching for "exclusionary rule" and "investigator" or
"detective."2" As a text on the allocation and deployment of police
resources states, "[P]atrol is the mainstay of police work."207 And the
involvement of a patrol officer in a particular case ends when the arrest
paperwork is turned in; at this point, the officer or a supervisor
formally "closes" the case, meaning that no further action is
necessary.208
If formal pressures do not encourage officers to care about
convictions, informal pressures actively discourage officer interest.
Law enforcement is not a career that lends itself to emotional closure.
Police interact with most people only briefly, often during a crisis, and
they will not typically interact with that individual again. Informally,
the culture of law enforcement is such that a patrol officer's
involvement in a criminal incident ends when they drop an arrestee off
at the jail. An officer who took part in James Q. Wilson's study of
204. ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT 7 (2009)
("[W]e know that patrol is important because it consumes the bulk of officer personnel
resources."); Brian A. Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2007, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS 6 (Dec. 2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf.
205. Jan M. Chaiken et al., The Cninmallnvestigation Process: A Summary Repor4
RAND CORP. 6-7 (June 1976), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/
P5628-1.pdf; Frank Horvath et al., A National Survey of Police Policies and Practices
Regarding the Cninal Invesbgation Process: Twenty-Five Yeats After Rand NAT'L CRIM.
JUST. REFERENCE SERVICE 7-8 (Nov. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/202
902.pdf ("[T]he role of the patrol officer in solving crimes ... remain[s] unchallenged as [a]
critical element[] underpinning the police criminal investigation process.").
206. WestlawNext searches conducted July 10, 2013. Notably, a search for "suppres-
sion" and "officer" or "deputy" and a search for "suppression" and "investigator" or
"detective" both returned over 10,000 results.
207. FRITSCH FT AL., supra note 204, at 17.
208. For purposes of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program, a police
department reports a crime "cleared by arrest" when at least one person has been arrested,
charged, and "[t]urned over to the court for prosecution." Cime in the United States, 2010:
Offenses Clear4 UNIFORM CRIME REP. 1 (Sept. 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/
ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/clearancetopic.pdf. As the FBI acknow-
ledges, this definition of "cleared by arrest" is a more restrictive definition than applied
administratively by police agencies. Id
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police behavior in the late 1960s made this point in the context of
combating organized crime by saying, "We keep [pressure] on these
gamblers because we feel that's our job. We mug 'em, we print 'em,
we book 'em. And what happens after that is not our business. We
have to keep reminding ourselves of that or we would get
discouraged."2 ' Some fifty years later, a Baltimore officer made a
similar point to Moskos: "[My supervisor] really likes arrests, and I
give them to him.. . . I don't give a shit if they [state's attorney] won't
take it. That's their problem."2"' A Baltimore police sergeant echoed
the sentiment, saying, "After it happens to you, you don't care. It's
your job to bring [a drug dealer to court]. What happens after that is
their problem. You can't take this job personal!"' Another
contemporary account is consistent; a former officer of a midsize
police agency outside of Seattle told me, "[I]t was somewhat difficult
to find out what happened with your cases [arrests]-you had to call
the prosecutor yourself. Normally we didn't bother. You handled your
case, launched it into the black hole, and went on to your next call."1
Though documentation of the phenomenon is likely nonexistent, it is
common for officers to receive informal guidance from more senior
colleagues advising them not to concern themselves with convictions.
As one former officer states in a personal blog:
It gets frustrating to an officer that spends hours on investigating,
paperwork and doing the foot work for a case to charge someone for
something to only see them get probation in court when in fact they
should have gotten some jail time.... I used to let this bother me very
much until an older officer came to me told me that if I continue to
worry about things like that I would end up having a heart attack. He
told me that the system isn't going to change over night and that all I
needed to worry about was doing my job right. After working a few
years I seen he was right and was able to pass that same information
down to other newer officers that were getting frustrated over the same
thing.213
This informal culture exists largely because of a lack of
information and control over the postarrest process. After making an
arrest, officers typically receive no or very little information on the
209. JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 106 (1968).
210. MosKos, supra note 123, at 44 (second and third alterations in original).
211. Id. at 78.
212. E-mail to author (Jan. 28, 2013, 11:42 EST) (on file with author).
213. Rowland C. Carper, Jr., A Convenient Store Workerd Job Is More Dangerous




ultimate disposition; officers may obtain some information from form
letters sent by the prosecutor's office and more from sitting in court
when the verdict is read, as the previous quote suggests, but neither
appears common. Officers typically have no say in the prosecution
decision, plea bargaining, or sentencing, even when they are the victim
of a criminal incident such as battery.2 14 They develop a disinterested
attitude that has been described as a "protective mantle of cynicism,"
which follows from an officer "los[ing] faith in their own capacity to
make a difference."2"5 Given their inability to impact the postarrest
process, officers often find it simpler and healthier to wash their hands
of the case as they drive away from the jail. As an extreme illustration
of officer indifference, consider the example of officers from the
Louisville Metro Police Department, a large police agency with some
1,200 sworn employees. In 2007 alone, over a thousand criminal
cases, including about 600 felonies, were dismissed because several
hundred officers simply did not bother to attend court proceedings.216
This was not an isolated problem; similar issues had been identified in
1999, 2001, and 2002. This informal disregard for convictions was at
least tacitly approved of by the agency, which did not discipline the
217officers in most cases.
In short, the largest group of officers, those whose actions are
most closely correlated with investigative results and convictions, have
no professional incentives to concern themselves with convictions, and
the nature of the job and the culture of law enforcement itself
informally discourage officers' interest in postarrest proceedings. Not
to mention that officers commonly make arrests not as a formal
invocation of the criminal justice system, but to advance some other
goal."' For example, an officer may make or threaten an arrest to
214. There may be important exceptions, particularly in smaller cities and towns where
the low number of prosecutors and police officers make collaboration easier. I have heard of
at least one prosecutor's office in which attorneys formally check with the arresting officer
before offering or accepting a plea deal, but I have been unable to obtain supporting
documentation. I have no reason to believe that such an arrangement is widespread, but I
acknowledge that officers in these jurisdictions are likely to be much more heavily invested in
the postarrest process than my thesis suggests.
215. HENRY, supra note 30, at 48.
216. Jason Riley & R.G. Dunlop, Hundreds of Cases Dismissed Because Police




218. WAYNE R. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
437 (1965) (dedicating an entire section to "[a]rrest[s] for [p]urposes [o]ther than
[p]rosecution").
2 014] 88 1
TULANE LA WREVIEW [Vol. 88:847
induce a person to do something that the officer lacks the legal
authority to order them to do,219 to establish the relative social standing
of the officer vis-A-vis the civilian they are dealing with,220 or to
facilitate the delivery of noncriminal social services.' In these
circumstances, the officer is supremely unconcerned about whether the
arrest ultimately ends in conviction because the arrest itself advanced
or accomplished the officer's ends.
If convictions are unimportant to officers, then the exclusion of
evidence and the corresponding reduction in the possibility of
conviction only serves to take away something that officers do not care
about-hardly an effective strategy for deterrence.222
219. Officers can use arrests as "leverage ... to control a suspect's behavior,"
threatening to make an arrest for some minor offense unless the person takes some action
unrelated to the offense. MOSKOs, supra note 123, at 119. For example, an officer may use
the threat of arrest for disorderly conduct to get an angry spouse to spend the night at
someone else's house after a nonviolent domestic dispute, where the officer lacks the formal
authority to order someone to leave the house.
220. See generally Diana Roberto Donahoe, "Could Have," "Would Have:" What the
Supreme Court Should Have Decided mn Whren v. United States, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv 1193,
1208 (1997) ("[An individual often is jailed for a minor offense because he fails the
'contempt of cop' test by refusing to show the officer proper respect.").
221. Arrest is not a good way to get people the services that they need-from anger
management classes to drug treatment programs-but it is the only compulsory action that
officers have available that could increase the chances of obtaining social services.
222. One might object to my contention that officers are unconcerned with postarrest
events by pointing out that, most of the time, officers both comply with the legal rules
governing police behavior-searches, seizures, and interrogations-and show up for
depositions, suppression hearings, and other court proceedings. Why, one might ask, would
they do so absent any interest in ensuring an eventual conviction? What the lack of formal
regard for convictions and the informal view that arrest is the end stage of an officer's
investment in a case tell us is that police officers adopt a deontological approach to rules
rather than a consequentialist perspective; rules are followed because they are rules, rather
than because they make a conviction more likely. In the context of arrests, officers may value
making a "good arrest," and one factor in determining the quality of an arrest involves
assessing whether it was done the "right" way, whether the rules were obeyed. But the
relevant assessment of whether an arrest was done the "right" way occurs at the time of arrest
or shortly thereafter, as the arresting officer's immediate supervisor(s) signs off on the
probable-cause statement or the arrest report. Once made, this determination resists ex post
reassessment, particularly by someone outside of the police department such as a prosecutor
or judge. To officers, the external judgment that results in the suppression of evidence
represents a failure of the legal system, and one that they largely disregard. Thus, the
announcement of a new rule that officers must follow has the potential to change officer
behavior in a way that a reduction in the possibility of conviction, without more, will not.
The deontological thesis effectively precludes basing a formal evaluation on convictions and
supports the informal approach of "handl[ing a] case, launch[ing] it into the black hole, and
[going] on to [the] next call." See supma note 212 and accompanying text.
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IV. IMPROVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF POLICE
The preceding Part provided three examples of the gap that can
separate a constitutional rule from the world that it regulates. This Part
first explains why that gap raises concerns about the constitutional
rules that regulate police. I then discuss several mechanisms that could
be of use in narrowing the gap.
A. Reasons for Concern
General concerns about the Court's use of legislative facts are
more expansive than this Article will address, reaching beyond the
Court's frequent police-related assertions to the use of legislative facts
more generally. Regardless, they are especially cogent in the context
of the constitutional regulation of police because of the threat to liberty
attendant to inaccuracy. Liberty has a privileged position in our social
and legal tradition. As one of the three unalienable rights upon which
our fledgling country was built,223 it remains a core value enshrined in
the Bill of Rights and central to the concept of justice that the rules of
criminal procedure seek to protect. Those rules are built to a
significant extent on the Court's conception of what police officers do
and the environment in which they do it. Thus, policing facts are an
important aspect of our legal system; when the Court gets them wrong,
liberty is threatened. In seeking ways to mitigate this threat, we must
be cognizant of the formal and informal obstacles that complicate the
task of gathering accurate facts about police.
1. The Risk of Inaccuracy
There is a potential for inaccuracy whenever the Court makes a
factual assertion, but that risk is especially high with regard to
legislative facts, which do not go through the pressure testing of the
adversarial process. And, for multiple reasons, the already-elevated
risk may run even higher in the context of policing. Information about
police practices is quite difficult to come by. Police culture has a well-
known insularity; officers' adoption of an "us versus them" attitude is
common enough to have been a central feature of the Mollen
Commission Report, which investigated corruption at the NYPD in the
mid-1990s,2' and an Anti-Corruption Report about the Chicago Police
223. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
224. See, e.g., MILTON MOLLEN ET AL., COMM'N To INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF
POLICE CORRUPTION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICY DEP'T, N.YC.,
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Department published in the first few weeks of 2013.225 The "blue
code of silence" not only "prevent[s] police supervisors and civilian
authorities from effectively eliminating police corruption,"26 it also
advances a strong informal norm that makes agencies and officers
reluctant to share detailed information about police practices with
outsiders.227 These barriers, already difficult to penetrate, have been
bolstered by technology 28 and, to a more significant extent, codified to
limit public access to information. The federal Freedom of
Information Act, for example, exempts from public disclosure "records
or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" when, inter
alia, that information "would disclose techniques and procedures for
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose
guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the
law" or when that information "could reasonably be expected to
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual."229 Many state
laws follow suit, and police departments use such exceptions to avoid
providing information about police practices230 and internal misconduct
investigations,23' which would both be useful sources of information
about what officers are actually doing.
Even when law enforcement agencies or individual employees
are willing to share information about police practices, relatively little
is available in written form at a useful level of specificity. A
substantial amount of formal and informal information about policing
practices is only communicated between officers orally.232 Agencies
maintain voluminous policy and procedure manuals that, for example,
instruct officers to "use only that degree of force necessary and
ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS 60 (1994) ("The Commission found the code of
silence and the 'Us vs. Them' mentality present wherever we found corruption.").
225. JOHN HAGEDORN ET AL., UNiv. OF ILL. AT CHI. DEP'T OF POLICAL SCI., CRIME,
CORRUPTION AND COVER-UPS IN THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 9-10 (2013).
226. Id.at2l.
227. See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical
Reexaminadon ofChimel andBelton, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 657, 664.
228. Jamison S. Prime, Note, A Double-Barrelled Assault: How Technology and
Judicial Interpretations Threaten Public Access to Law Enforcement Records, 48 FED. COMM.
L.J. 341, 354-57 (1996) (describing how the police's use of in-car computers disrupted the
status quo of the media's capturing of police dispatch information by listening to police
scanners).
229. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012).
230. See Moskovitz, supm note 227, at 664.
231. Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela Campos, Sunshine on the Thin Blue Line: Public
Access to Police InternalAffairs Files, 22 CoMM. LAW. 34, 35 (2004).
232. See Moskovitz, supra note 227, at 664.
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reasonable under the circumstances" and to "either escalate or de-
escalate the use of force as the situation progresses or circumstances
change,"233 but officers are likely to learn how to make reasonableness
determinations-Is it appropriate to use a baton on a fleeing
misdemeanant? When should pepper spray be deployed?-and how to
escalate or deescalate by listening to more experienced peers and
training officers. Of course, even when the rules are meaningfully
documented by an authoritative source-a departmental policy manual
rather than, say, a privately published training manual-they may not
reflect actual police practice if an informal rule has largely replaced
the formal rule.234  Further complicating matters is the tremendous
variation in police practices; different patrol units in the same
department in the same city might operate quite differently depending
on the neighborhoods in their beat, the timing of their shift, and their
unit supervisors. There may be even more variation between
departments in different parts of the country, departments with a
different number of employees, or departments responsible for
jurisdictions of different sizes.
Although there is little authoritative information about police
practices available to courts or commentators, there is no shortage of
readily available depictions of what police officers do. Few people
have not seen a few episodes of CST Crime Scene Investigation or
Law & Order, watched a summer blockbuster like the Lethal Weapon
or Die Hard series, or read a novel that featured a police officer or
investigator. Not to mention the dominant role that crime stories-
most of which feature police-play in the news media. The
combination of limited information and colorful portrayals in the
media lends itself to the use of a questionable availability heuristic. 235
Yet, because "[p]eople are chronically overconfident in judging the
probability of their correctness on factual questions, intuitions about
what police work looks like in practice are too easily taken as fact.
233. DenverPoliceDepartment Operations Manual, supra note 125, § 105.01(l)(a).
234. MOSKOS, supra note 123, at 26-27. I resist the implication that this observation
necessarily undermines my contentions in Part II, which argue that there is reason to doubt
the accuracy of several of the Court's unsupported factual assertions about police.
235. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Whath Available? Social Influences and Behavioral
Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1295, 1297 (2003) ("Under the availability heuristic, people
assess probabilities by asking whether examples readily come to mind. Lacking statistical
information, people substitute an easy question (Can I think of illustrations?) for a hard
question (What realities do the data actually show?)." (footnote omitted)).
236. J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAw & PHIL. 393, 396 (2005); see




Thus, individuals are comfortable accepting and relying on what may
turn out to be an inaccurate assessment of police practices. This may
be particularly acute among members of the judiciary, for whom police
officers are guards, escorts, and court officers.237
2. The Effect of Inaccuracy on Liberty
Inaccuracy is troubling not just in its own right, but because of
the role that legislative facts can play in the framing of the Court's
inquiry, the tailoring of a regulatory solution, and how the Court's
factual assertions often go beyond the particular opinion in which they
are made.
a. Framing
The Court's background understanding of the world shapes
constitutional rule making, serving as a threshold determination that
effectively limits the set of questions that the Court will reach within a
particular case. Inaccuracy can preclude the Court from engaging with
the world as it exists. For example, after concluding that use-of-force
incidents involve split-second decision making, the Court hardly needs
to engage with "counterfactual" inquiries by addressing how to
regulate police force in circumstances that do not require split-second
decision making. If facts serve to focus the Court's inquiry,
inaccuracies only distort the deliberative process.
b. Unintended Consequences
A rule based on a factual misapprehension is less likely to have
the effect that the Court intended. When the Court considers a given
rule, it makes the decision to adopt or reject that rule based on the
expected result. When a rule is designed around an accurate
understanding of the world, we might expect the Court's expectations
to align with the result.238 Correspondingly, a rule grounded in a
misunderstanding may not align with the world it was designed to
237. Cf United States v. IEV, 705 F3d 430, 444 (9th Cir 2012) (Kozinski, C.J,
dissenting) (stating that judges are "protected by U.S. Marshals with guns and dogs,
surrounded by concrete barriers and security cameras").
238. This may well be true, even though we could identify that it might be under- or
overinclusive in some relevant way; that the law of unintended consequences may come into
play at some point; or that changing circumstances may, at some indeterminable point in the
future, reduce the rule's fit. Cf FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAwYER: A NEW




regulate, resulting in either more or less regulation than the Court
intended. The exclusionary rule illustrates this effect; to the extent that
suppression is based on deterrence, there are good reasons to believe
that it does not have the deterrent value that the Court anticipated and
thus overregulates the police. Additionally, the failure of "fit" raises
federalism concerns when one considers that policing is a particularly
localized exercise of government power. When the Court bases a
regulatory decision on a factual misunderstanding, it obstructs local
control without providing the benefit that theoretically justifies such
obstruction.
c. "Factual Precedent"
The effects of inaccuracy can be far more widespread than a
single regulatory decision by the Court. Once a particular assertion
has been set out in an opinion, both the Court and others may view that
statement in the future as particularly apt or reliable, becoming what
Allison Orr Larsen calls a "factual precedent."' The assertion may be
recycled by the Court itself in future opinions,24 as well as by lower
court judges. Recall that the Court's description of use-of-force
incidents as involving "split-second decisions" has been quoted in
more than 2300 lower court opinions,241 features in model jury
instructions,2 42 and is echoed outside of the judiciary by police
departments, 243 industry authorities,2" and popular-media sources.245
239. Allison Orr Larsen, FactualPrecedents, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 59 (2013).
240. See, eg., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342 (2009) (relying on a prior
concurrence to assess the probability that an individual could gain access to their vehicle after
being arrested).
241. See Larsen, supra note 239; supra note 121 and accompanying text.
242. The description of police use-of-force incidents as requiring "split-second
judgments," for example, has been incorporated into model jury instructions in both state and
federal courts. Seesupmnote 122 and accompanying text.
243. The Denver Police Department's Use of Force Policy, for example, recites the
Court's assertion about "split-second judgment[] in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving" almost verbatim, omitting only two em dashes. Compare Denver
Police Department Operations Manual, supm note 125, § 105.01(1)a. (tracking Graham's
language), with Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("[P]olice officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.").
244. A senior instructor at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, for example,
uses a statement by the Court in Graham-that there can be no "precise definition or
mechanical application" to determine whether force was reasonable, 490 U.S. at 396-to
advocate for the elimination of agency force matrices that seek to guide officers' force
decisions. John Bostain, Training Without Force Continuums: Learn To Love the Law,
POLICEONE.COM (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.policeone.com/law-enforcement-newsletter/
Calibre-Press-Newsline-03-19-09#Storyl (Secure Law Enforcement Log-in) (subscription
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B. Improving the Accuacy ofLegislative Facts
Even with the elevated potential for inaccuracy and the attendant
risks, one may conclude that the Court's use of police-related
legislative facts is typically desirable. Arguably, it provides a degree of
transparency by making explicit the unavoidable assumptions that
would otherwise go unobserved, and compiling a body of police-
related factual assertions can give the attentive reader a more
sophisticated understanding of how the Court views the institution and
practice of law enforcement. Such an understanding may aid the
challenges of doctrinal analysis and prediction. They may also provide
a lever upon which future legal reform can be based; when Gant
modified the rules governing vehicle searches incident to arrest, the
primary justification for the change was the Court's rejection of the
factual assumption that motivated the prior version of the rule.246 If
one believes that there are benefits that justify the Court's use of
police-related legislative facts such that they are problematic only
when inaccurate, the question becomes how best to ensure the
accuracy of the Court's factual assertions about police. This section
suggests methods of improving the current system of top-down
constitutional regulation of police by increasing the accuracy of the
facts upon which the Court relies.
1. Relying on the Parties
Perhaps the most pertinent source of information is the parties
themselves. Before even turning its attention to a particular case, the
Court could prompt the parties to provide relevant legislative facts by
amending the rule that governs the content of merits briefs. Currently,
Supreme Court Rule 24(l)(g) directs parties to include in their briefs
"[a] concise statement of the case, setting out the facts material to the
required); see also Fed. Law Enforcement Training Ctrs., Use ofForce-Myths and Realities
Part I, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURrry, http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-
division/podcasts/hot-issues-podcasts/hot-issues-transcripts/use-of-force-myths-and-realities-
part-i-podcast-transcript.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) (advocating more of a reasonable-
ness standard for evaluating use-of-force decisions).
245. See, e.g., Steve Schmadeke, Dolton Police Officerk Excessive-Force Trial
Underway, Cm. TRiB. (May 7, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-07/news/ct-
met-colton-cop-beating-20130508_1_Police-officer-chief-robert-fox-dolton (reporting that an
officer's attorney was arguing, in a criminal prosecution of the officer for excessive force,
"that prosecutors were attempting to second-guess a police officer's split-second decision
while working a dangerous beat").
246. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350-51 (2009) (rejecting the factual predicate that
the Court relied upon in New York v Belton 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
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consideration of the questions presented, with appropriate references to
the joint appendix."2 47  The existing language could be modified to
prompt the inclusion of legislative facts that the parties believe relevant
to the favorable interpretation or development of a rule. Alternatively,
the Court could expand the brief requirements so as to require parties
to identify relevant legislative facts in a separate portion of their brief.
This information could serve as a starting point for the Court, which
would be beneficial even if a party is unable to provide a fully fleshed-
out empirical statement. Thus, the rules could be used to prompt a
litigant raising a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim to identify
the prevalence of a particular weapon among law enforcement
agencies as a relevant legislative fact even if the party does not itself
have exact data.
Of course, the Court itself might not know what facts are relevant
until it has begun to explore the case. It may be appropriate for the
Court to take an active role in soliciting from the parties the factual
information that it seeks. These requests could take one of several
forms. First, the Court could remand the case for additional fact-
finding. The benefits of this approach mesh well with the existing
structure of modern litigation, and the parties' control over the details
and the presentation of facts would align to some extent with the
perceived benefits of the adversarial system.248
Second, the Court could forgo remand and instead direct the
parties to provide additional factual information in a supplemental
brief. Currently, the Court can seek supplemental briefing both
before2 49 and after.. oral argument. The current practice of soliciting
supplemental briefing when the Court seeks the parties' input on
various legal questions could easily be extended to factual questions.
Indeed, the Court has occasionally taken steps in this direction. During
oral argument in Mimnda v Arizona, for example, Justice Fortas
requested that the Solicitor General provide information about the
247. Sup. CT. R. 24(1)(g).
248. See genemlly Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversaial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-
Record Factfindmg, 61 DuKE L.J. 1, 13-25 (2011) ("[T]here is no reason to worry about the
quality of the factual findings that underlie the decisions the U.S. judicial system reaches, at
least insofar as the adversarial system can be relied upon as a rigorous means of testing
factual claims.").
249. See, e g., Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 133 S. Ct. 89 (2012) (mem.)
(directing the parties and inviting the Solicitor General to file supplemental briefs on the
issue of mootness).
250. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 927 (2013) (mem.) (granting a
petitioner's request to file a postargument supplemental brief).
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interrogation practices of the FBI; the response was later incorporated
into the Court's opinion.25'
A third option relies on the observation that the Court may be
better suited to administer fact-finding than is often thought.252 When
it exercises original jurisdiction, as in litigation between the states, the
Court appoints a Special Master to take evidence and, if necessary,
issue subpoenas.253 A corresponding procedure could be adopted when
the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction, at least for the limited
purpose of gathering legislative facts.2 " A fourth option would be to
order a second round of oral argument, as is occasionally done for
questions of law.255
The final three options-requesting supplemental briefing,
appointing a Special Master, and ordering additional oral argument-
impose costs on the Court but relieve the burdens of remand, which
"may be a drain on the resources of the court and litigants and a
disservice to societal interests. "256 Further, these options avoid what
may be an exercise in futility; appellate courts do not defer to a trial
court's determinations of legislative fact,257 relegating trial courts to a
largely administrative task that would serve a similar role to a
magistrate's report and recommendation on dispositive motions.258
251. 384 U.S. 436, 483 (1966).
252. See, eg., Philip B. Kurland, Towarda PoliticalSuprme Cour4 37 U. CI. L. REv.
19, 38-39 (1969) (reflecting the long-standing common wisdom that the Court is not well-
suited for fact-finding).
253. See, eg., New Jersey v. Delaware, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006) (mem.).
254. I take no position on whether such a step is within the Court's prerogative absent
legislation specifically authorizing the practice.
255. See, eg., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.)
(ordering reargument and directing the parties to file supplemental briefs about the scope of a
statute).
256. John C. Godbold, Fact Fnding by Appellate Courts-An Available and
Appropriate Power, 12 CuMB. L. RE. 365, 368 (1982).
257. Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Tinags: Decided Disputed
Premise Facts, 73 MiNN. L. REv. 1, 41 (1988) ("[H]igher courts owe no deference to a trial
court and may make their own determinations of [legislative] facts."). Robert Keeton uses the
term "premise facts,' meaning "facts that explicitly or implicitly serve as premises used to
decide issues of law," instead of the term "legislative facts," which he uses to mean facts
found by a legislature. Id. at 8-9. Keeton's definition of "premise facts" is analogous to my
use of Davis's term "legislative facts."
258. See FED. R. CIV P. 72(b) & advisory committee's note (1983 Addition) ("[T]he
rule requires the district judge to whom the case is assigned to make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report, findings, or recommendations to which timely objection is
made. The term 'de novo' signifies that the magistrate's findings are not protected by the




This Subpart has mapped some possible party-dependent avenues
for improvement, but attention must be given to a prominent
"Caution!" sign. Some parties-individual criminal defendants and
constitutional-tort plaintiffs-are unlikely to be in a position that lends
itself to high-quality fact gathering. "[I]n many cases, [litigants] will
not do a good job [presenting legislative facts] because they do not
have the expertise or the resources to gather the relevant evidence.""
Even assuming that the Court could speak with some precision about
which facts it wanted the parties to provide, which may mitigate the
expertise problem, nothing serves to correct the problem of limited
resources. Further, relying on the parties for legislative facts raises
potential principal/agent problems among individual litigants such as
criminal defendants and constitutional-tort plaintiffs. Individual
litigants are unlikely to have any vested interest in shaping the legal
rule beyond its impact in their case, an observation that raises
questions about a criminal defendant's or a constitutional-tort
plaintiff's commitment to gathering policing facts.260 The benefits of
relying on litigants, passively or actively, may be most fully realized
with repeat players who either have a particular expertise or face lower
barriers to obtaining the relevant information,26 1 but this, too, is not
without complication. Police agencies and unions representing
individual officers may be motivated to maintain a degree of obscurity
or to take an extremely selective approach to revealing "insider"
information, particularly when they benefit from the status quo and are
concerned about the Court limiting their authority.
2. Going Beyond the Parties
It is now widely recognized that appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, do a substantial amount of independent fact-finding.262
Because of their institutional limits, the most common refrain is to
limit this function or shift it to an administrative agency.2 3 But even if
we retain the traditional role of the trial court with regard to
259. Gorod, supra note 248, at 10.
260. Francis A. Allen, Preface to ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN
LEGISLAITON, at xxvii (2d ed. 1965) ("When interests are litigated in particular cases, they not
only appear as scattered and isolated interests, but their social incidence is obscured by the
adventitious personal factor which colors every controversy.").
261. For example, police agencies that are notoriously unresponsive to researchers
may be more inclined to share information with other agencies.
262. See Gorod, supm note 248, at 26-35; Larsen, supm note 8, at 1264-71.
263. See Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antirust Needs a
New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1247, 1248-50 (2011).
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adjudicative facts, it is worth exploring the possibility of formally
revising the Court's capacity as a fact-finding body.
In contemporary litigation, the Court receives submissions from
interested nonparties in the form of amicus briefs. This provides
another avenue for the Court to solicit and obtain factual information.
In one respect, this avenue is already well-traveled. Noting the
dramatic increase in the sheer number of amicus briefs filed in recent
years, Larsen has stated that "Supreme Court Justices cannot help but
be inundated with factual research presented from within the
adversarial process."2' As far as we can tell, though, the Court does
not rely extensively on contemporary amicus briefs."' This may be
attributable to the presentation or content of the briefs, which "tend to
be duplicative, poorly written, or merely lobbying documents not
grounded in sound argument"266 and "seldom offer insights or
arguments not already available to those to whom they are
submitted."267 Policing facts justify increased attention to relevant
amici; policing should be included among the highly technical,
particularly specialized, or obscure topics that amicus briefs are
considered especially good at illuminating.268
By taking an active position calling for the submission of amicus
curiae briefs on a specific factual issue, the Court could make clear
that it sought elucidation on legislative facts rather than on points of
law, making its request as broad or narrow as it deems useful.' Nor
would this necessarily entail an open call for all interested amici to
provide responsive legislative facts; instead, it could do so selectively.
In the legal context, it is not at all uncommon for the Court to appoint a
264. Larsen, supra note 8, at 1272 (emphasis omitted).
265. Id. at 1274 (identifying that using the most conservative estimate, more than half
of the 120 most salient Supreme Court cases between 2000 and 2010 include at least one
"factual source" that had not been presented by the parties or amici). It is worth noting,
however, that there is no academic consensus on the "utility and impact of amicus briefs."
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supmme Coui 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 745 (2000).
266. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effecdve Amicus
Cwiae Bnefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 45 (2004).
267. Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, With Friends Like These ... , 70
A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (1984).
268. Cf Lynch, supra note 266, at 41.
269. This could be used not just to identify specific questions of legislative fact
("What types of force do police departments instruct officers to use to overcome passive
resistance?"), but also at a broader level of generality to determine what factual
considerations might be relevant to apply a constitutional regulation ("Describe the
considerations that inform officers' use-of-force decisions.").
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specific amicus to argue a particular point of law' or to seek legal
advice from the Solicitor General."' This procedure could be easily
co-opted; should the Court identify a particular nonparty that it
believes has or has access to relevant information-law enforcement
agencies, police trade associations, or civil liberties groups, for
example-it could invite that entity's participation by posing a specific
factual question or seeking information about a particular police-
related subject. In essence, the Court could gather reliable data by
certifying a factual question to a specific source or group of sources.
Indeed, the Court has already engaged in this practice to a limited
extent, having actively directed the Supreme Court librarians to seek
out certain information and relying on what they find in at least nine
opinions between 2000 and 2010."'
In this way, the Court has already accepted that expert insight into
complex or abstruse factual areas can both help identify the scope of
relevant legislative facts and assist with the fact-gathering process.
This observation leads naturally to the idea of using Court-appointed
subject matter experts or a panel of experts to provide or vet legislative
facts. This proposal, though not yet widely adopted, has received
considerable attention from appellate judges; Judge Posner has spoken
about the need to appoint neutral experts to help the court navigate
complicated technological concepts.273
Expanding on this possibility, the Court could go beyond the
ability to gather existing information by develophg new legislative
facts. The Court could be given the authority to order an expert study
of particular police practices, to require police departments to gather
270. See Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici
Cuise To DefendAbandonedLower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REv. 907, 909-10 (2011)
(identifying forty-three occasions on which the Court appointed an attorney to argue a
position abandoned by one of the parties and calculating that such an appointment occurs
approximately twice each term).
271. Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Essay, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U.
CI. L. REv 859, 880-86 (2013) (describing the Supreme Court's practice of requesting that
the Solicitor General provide legal advice when the government is not a party to the case).
272. Larsen, supra note 8, at 1289-90.
273. Ameet Sachdev, Federal Judge Richard Posner Takes on Science and Law, CI.
TRus. (May 11, 2012, 5:30 AM), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-11/business/ct-
biz-0511-chicago-law-2012051 1Jjudges-law-clerks-7th-circuit-bar-association. Sitting by
designation as a trial court judge over a patent dispute between Apple and Motorola, Judge
Posner took his own advice by appointing an expert to "provide information to judges and
juries on technical issues." Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Posner Prsidi2g at Patent Tial,





certain data, or to order econometric models to trace the impact of a
particular rule on officer behavior. This could be done externally,
through the use of experts, or through the creation of a research
apparatus within the Court itself.274 The Court could task the Federal
Judicial Center, "the education and research agency for the federal
courts,"275 with developing materials that could be used to elucidate
police practices.
C Rethmng the Use of UnsupportedPolice-RelatedLegislative
Facts
Each of the preceding suggestions is grounded in the need to
provide the Court with better facts that are supported by something
other than intuition and guesswork. A more radical solution presents
itself, though, in the form of a diminished use of police-related
legislative facts by the Court. Under the stronger version of this
solution, the Court would adopt a minimalist approach to factual
suppositions about the policing environment and officer practices.
Legal principles and constitutional protections could be applied to
individual cases, and new principles could be announced to guide
future litigation, but neither the rules nor the ruling would be
predicated on general facts about the world except in the most basic
sense. Under the strong version, then, Fourth Amendment
determinations would rest on what Akhil Amar calls "ordinary
common-sense reasonableness" and the analysis of the facts of a
particular case, rather than on the factual generalizations that dominate
the current, squishy, pseudoempirical evaluation of the various quanta
of proof.276 Similarly, the exclusionary rule could not rest on
assumptions of its deterrent value, though it could be retained as a
variant of the legal principle that no entity, including the government,
should benefit from its own wrongdoing. This approach would push
the Court to favor heavily the use of legal standards rather than the
development of bright-line rules. If clear rules play an important role
in informing civilians of "the scope of [their] constitutional
protection[s]" and identifying for officers "the scope of [their]
authority,"277 a strong aversion to the Court's use of legislative facts
could displace its regulation of the police by shifting it to entities-the
274. Davis, supra note 59, at 5 (advocating for the creation of a Supreme Court
equivalent of the Congressional Research Service).
275. FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
276. Amar, supra note 16, at 801.
277. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981).
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legislature and administrative agencies both seem plausible-that may
have a greater institutional competence for gathering and assessing
legislative facts.
A weaker aversion to the Court's use of police-related legislative
facts, in contrast, would seek to rein in the indiscriminate recitation of
unsupported factual suppositions. If one believes that the regulation of
police is properly or inevitably within the Court's purview, it follows
that the Court's background understanding of the world will, and
perhaps should, play a role in its analyses. Here, the Court would be
free, and even encouraged, to use police-related legislative facts for
which it can provide external support. The need for attribution could
have a constraining effect on the Court that may lead to greater
accuracy, or at least a more defensible conclusion, than intuition alone.
D Going Beyond the Court
This Article has focused on the Court's practice of using police-
related legislative facts and on methods of improving the accuracy of
the facts that it recites. It would be remiss, though, not to acknowledge
the potential for gathering policing facts beyond the Court and outside
of the judicial process. The Court's fact-heavy rhetoric, combined with
the relative difficulty of obtaining such facts, suggests that
organizations interested in police reform could benefit by extending
their research efforts. The ACLU, for example, could add a "policing
project," and government agencies and academic institutions could
develop or partner with specialized research centers like the National
Police Research Platform, which is currently conducting limited
research on thirty of the nation's law enforcement agencies."'
Additional legislative or agency attention is also appropriate. A
great deal of information about law enforcement is conceptually
obtainable but does not currently exist in any collected or useful form.
For a recent example, consider the way that concerns about racial
profiling drove the collection of traffic-stop data. A decade ago, few
agencies bothered to collect data about a driver's race or officer
actions. Starting with a North Carolina statute passed in 1999,279 state
legislatures and individual police departments began requiring their
officers to track racial characteristics of the people they were stopping
278. See Paticipating Agencies, NAT'L POLICE RES. PLATFORM, http://www.national
policeresearch.org/agency-profiles-phase-1/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
279. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-10.01 (2013).
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and any enforcement or investigative actions taken during the stop."o
Today, this body of data enables empirical examination of the extent of
racial profiling, the better to combat such abuses.2 '
A similar metric could be implemented by state legislatures or
individual police agencies to evaluate various aspects of officer
performance.28 This may prove particularly useful in assessing
investigative detentions, as the recent NYPD "Stop and Frisk"
litigation has shown.283 Under Teny, a stop is justified only when an
officer "observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot."2" Yet despite the apparent limiting principle, we have little
foundation on which to judge whether a particular observation is
unusual or whether it lends itself to the belief that "criminal activity
may be afoot." Consequently, reasonable suspicion has become quite a
low standard, "to the point that a few innocent activities grouped
280. At the time of writing, twenty-five states had passed statutes requiring or
encouraging officers to record a range of biographical data as well as officer actions taken
during the traffic stop. Background and Curent Data Collecton Efforts: Jurisdiedons
Currently Collecdng Data, RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION RESOURCE CTR.,
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/background/jurisdictions.php (last visited Mar.
27, 2014). Agencies in another twenty-two states and the District of Columbia collect such
data voluntarily. Id Now, only three states-Vermont, North Dakota, and Mississippi--do
not collect data on traffic stops.
281. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner & Derek Epp, Final Report to the North
Carolia Advocates for Justice Task Forve on Racial and Ethnic Bias, UNIv. N.C. CHAPEL
HILL (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.unc.edu/-fbaum/papers/Baumgartner-Traffic-Stops-
Statistics-1-Feb-2012.pdf. North Carolina now makes agency traffic stop reports available
via the Internet, searchable by agency, date, and report type. Traffic Stop Reports; N.C.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://trafficstops.ncdoj.gov/Default.aspx?pageid=2 (last visited Mar. 27,
2014).
282. The actual entity that mandates the tracking of data is, for my purposes, relatively
unimportant. Such a requirement may come down from several sources. Two possibilities
are administrative (departmental) regulation and conditions on grant funding. Rachel A.
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rts Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1, 30-
33 & n.109 (2009) (discussing the collection of data on police misconduct). Another
possibility is the imposition of conditions for accreditation through an organization like the
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, see Law Enforcement
Accreditadon, CALEA, http://www.calea.org/content/law-enforcement-accreditation (last
visited Mar. 27, 2014) (describing itself as a widely used independent accrediting body), or a
state accrediting body, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.125 (2013) (establishing the Commission
for Florida Law Enforcement Accreditation, Inc.). Regardless of which mechanism is
ultimately chosen, there is a role for the Court in modvadng that choice.
283. Floyd v. New York, 283 ER.D. 153, 166-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing the
NYPD's "UF-250" form, on which NYPD officers must describe, inter alia, the circum-
stances that gave rise to each Terry stop they initiate).
284. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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together, or even no suspicious acdvides at all, can be enough.""' As
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
observed, "Whether you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at
the speed limit, you will be described by the police as acting
suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you. Such subjective,
promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited.""
And they need not be. As a decade of data about traffic stops shows,
investigative detentions are susceptible to better analyses than currently
exist; the collected data could be used to quantify the extent to which
factors, individually or collectively, are indicative that criminal activity
really is afoot.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article identified how the Court's perceptions of police-
related facts-the environment in which police services are provided,
the details of police practices, and the considerations that motivate
police actions-mold the constitutional rules that regulate law
enforcement. The Court's understanding is often reflected in the form
of factual assertions made without citation or support, raising
fundamental questions about their accuracy.
Using three examples-the use of force, consent searches, and
the exclusionary rule-I demonstrated ways that erroneous factual
predicates have resulted in rules that are badly aligned with the world
that they purport to regulate. By concluding that most use-of-force
situations require officers to make "split-second judgments,"287 the
Court has adopted a more deferential standard for reviewing police
violence than the circumstances typically require. By concluding that
it would be "thoroughly impractical" for officers to inform civilians of
the right to refuse consent, the Court has encouraged police to rely on
informational asymmetry rather than the knowing surrender of
constitutional protections.288 And by incorrectly assuming that officers
are concerned with convictions, the Court exaggerates the extent to
which the exclusion of evidence will deter future violations.
There are a variety of mechanisms that could enable the Court to
narrow the gap between any given constitutional rule and the world
that it regulates. The Court could better leverage the parties, amici,
285. David A. Harris, Factors forReasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
StoppedandFriske4 69 INr.D. L.J. 659, 669 (1994).
286. United States v. Broomfield, 417 F3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005).
287. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
288. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,231(1973).
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experts, and independent judicial fact-finding so as to improve the
process of identifying and gathering relevant and accurate legislative
facts.
The essential focus in this Article, at the risk of oversimpli-
fication, was how the Court's perception of policing affects its
regulation of police. Though there is ample reason to hope for
improvement, this Article provides an important touchstone in the
ongoing discussion about the role that the constitutional regime should
play in the regulation of police."' The observations in the preceding
pages should prompt further exploration of this phenomenon and set
the stage for further research into how courts affect police officers.
Future work could explore how police respond, at both an institutional
and individual level, to regulation. Understanding the parameters of
the feedback loop between courts and law enforcement and knowing
how police departments operationalize constitutional standards are
critical to understanding how to regulate law enforcement.
289. See, eg, Harmon, supm note 194, at 761.
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